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Equitable Recoupment Revisited: The
Scope of the Doctrine in Federal Tax
Cases after United States v. Dalm
By JAMEs E. TIERNEY*
INTRODUCTION
Justice Jackson, speaking of no less distinguished an institution
than the Supreme Court of the United States, observed, "We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only
because we are final."' In a case involving the increasingly less
settled area of federal taxation, Justice Brandeis stated, "[I]n most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.' '2 These judicial pronounce-
ments reflect a tension within the law between the attainment of
two sometimes conflicting objectives: finality and correctness.
Statutes of limitations, which prescribe the time within which
a claim must be asserted, aid the goal of finality in the law. Such
statutes can be found in the Internal Revenue Code, limiting the
time within which the government may determine and collect tax
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A. 1978,
Rutgers College; J.D. 1981, New York University School of Law; LL.M. (in Taxation)
1984, New York University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges support
provided by the University of Toledo College of Law Faculty Summer Research Grant
program, as well as the able and dedicated research assistance of James B. Dietz, a third
year student at the University of Toledo College of Law.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). That the tax law seems increasingly less settled probably requires no citation,
but for those that insist, note the following parade of tax statutes enacted within the last
decade: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324; the
Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494; the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1991; the Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1330; the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
102 Stat. 3342; the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat.
2301; and the latest, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388.
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deficiencies 3 and taxpayers may claim refunds for overpayments.4
Justice Jackson described such statutes as "almost indispensable
element[s] of fairness as well as of practical administration of an
income tax policy."'5 He noted that their absence likely would be
"all but intolerable," resulting in "an income tax system under
which there never would come a day of final settlement and which
[would] require[ ] both the taxpayer and the Government to stand
ready forever and a day to produce vouchers, prove events, estab-
lish values and recall details of all that goes into an income tax
contest.' '6
Although statutes of limitations do promote the goal of finality,
they also may present obstacles to achieving the goal of correctness.
3 In general, the government has three years from the filing of a return within which
to determine a tax deficiency relating to the return. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1988). However,
this general rule is subject to numerous exceptions and qualifications. For example, there
is no limitation on the period for assessing a deficiency if the return is false or fraudulent,
if there is a willful attempt to evade tax, or if no return is filed. See id. § 6501(c)(1)-(3).
Also, the time for assessment may be extended by an agreement between the government
and the taxpayer entered into before the expiration of the limitations period. See id. §
6501(c)(4). An extended, six year period applies when an income tax return contains a
substantial omission from gross income or an estate or gift tax return contains substantial
omissions. See id. § 6501(e)(1)-(2). Numerous other special rules exist. See also id. § 6501.
The Commissioner generally must "assess" a tax before seeking to collect it. See id.
§ 6502. See generally id. §§ 6201-6207 (general provisions on assessment). Under I.R.C. §
6501(a), any tax due generally must be assessed within three years after the return was filed.
In the case of deficiencies in income, estate and gift taxes, and certain excise taxes, certain
restrictions and special assessment rules apply. See id. §§ 6201(d), 6204(b). Specifically, the
Commissioner is precluded from assessing a deficiency in such taxes until 90 days (150 days
if the statutory notice is addressed to a person outside the United States) after the mailing
of a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer. See id. §§ 6212, 6213(a). During this period the
taxpayer may file a petition with the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of the
deficiency; if such a petition is timely filed, the Commissioner may not assess or seek to
collect the tax in question until the court's decision has become final pursuant to I.R.C. §
7481. See id. § 6213(a). The statute of limitations on assessment is suspended for the period
during which the Commissioner is so precluded from assessing or collecting the deficiency.
See id. § 6503(a)(1). Accordingly, in view of this statutory framework, the Commissioner
generally must mail a notice of deficiency of such taxes within the applicable limitations
period set forth in I.R.C. § 6501(a).
4 A claim for refund generally must be filed within three years from the time the
return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of these periods
expires later, although various exceptions and qualifications exist here as well. See I.R.C.
§ 6511(a), (b)-(h) (1988). A timely filed refund claim is a prerequisite for bringing a refund
suit. See id. § 7422(a). If a timely refund claim is filed, a refund suit may not be brought
any earlier than six months after the filing of the refund claim (unless the claim is disallowed
during that period) or any later than two years after the date on which the government
mails a notice that the claim has been disallowed. See id. § 6532(a).
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 (1946).
6 Id.
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With hindsight, it may be determined that the treatment given a
particular matter was erroneous, but if the applicable statute of
limitations has expired, deference to the policy of finality militates
against correction of the error. In matters of federal taxation,
failure to correct or take account of such an error can be problem-
atic, not merely because it offends an abstract desire for correct-
ness, but because it can create special difficulties in the federal tax
system, which operates primarily on a temporal, rather than trans-
actional, basis. Under such a system, an erroneously treated item
or transaction may have significance with respect to other years or
taxes not barred by the statute of limitations. If the error goes
uncorrected, future inconsistencies and inequities can result to tax-
payers and the government alike.
Such problems can occur within a single tax or with respect to
two different taxes. Consider the federal income tax system, which
operates primarily on the basis of fixed annual accounting periods,
or taxable years .7 If an item was treated erroneously under the
income tax for a taxable year now closed by the statute of limita-
tions, but is given its theoretically correct treatment for an open
year, without considering the prior error, inequities can result. For
example, a single item of income may be subjected to income tax
twice: the first time erroneously and the second time correctly,
with the statute of limitations barring correction of the prior error.8
7 E.g., Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 363 (1931):
All the revenue acts which have been enacted since the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment have uniformly assessed the tax on the basis of annual
returns showing the net result of all the taxpayer's transactions during a fixed
accounting period, either the calendar year or, at the option of the taxpayer,
the particular fiscal year which he may adopt.
See also, e.g., Hershey Foods Corp. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 312, 319-20 (1981) (citations
omitted):
Federal income taxes are computed on an annual basis, not on a transactional
basis. Each year stands on its own. A transactional approach under which we
would wait to see the end result of an entire business venture before deter-
mining the proper tax consequences might be thought by some to be more
equitable, but that is not the approach used in our system of income taxation.
8 Assume, for example, that a cash-method taxpayer erroneously, but in good faith,
believes that an item of gross income actually received in 1991 was constructively received
in 1990. She thus includes the item on her 1990 federal income tax return filed April 15,
1991 and omits it from her 1991 return, filed April 15, 1992. On these facts, the taxpayer
ordinarily must file a refund claim for 1990 on or before April 15, 1994, but the government
will have until April 15, 1995 to determine a deficiency for 1991. Thus, if the government
asserts an income tax deficiency for 1991 based on this item between April 15, 1994 and
April 15, 1995, that determination will be timely and effective, even though, strictly applying
the statute of limitations, the taxpayer will be barred from claiming a refund of the tax
1990-91]
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Conversely, an item of income may escape taxation entirely. 9 Anal-
ogous problems can occur with regard to deductions, variously
resulting in their double allowance or double disallowance.10
The foregoing situations result largely from the assignment
of a transaction to an incorrect taxable year, now closed under
the statute of limitations, while the correct year remains open.
However, they can also occur when a transactionis assigned to
the correct taxable year, but treated erroneously. A common
situation involves the receipt of property by a taxpayer. The tax
basis of property often depends upon the nature of the trans-
action in which it was received. If the transaction was taxable
(i.e., one in which gain or loss was recognized), the property
usually takes a fair market value basis." If the transaction was
nontaxable (i.e., one in which gain or loss was not recognized),
it usually takes a substituted basis, often determined by reference
to the basis of property given up by the taxpayer.' 2 If a trans-
action was treated erroneously as taxable or nontaxable in a year
closed by the statute of limitations, and subsequently the prop-
erty is accorded its theoretically "proper" basis notwithstanding
the prior error, a double inclusion or exclusion of gain'3
overpaid for 1990 resulting from the erroneous inclusion of the item in income for that
year.
For example, assume that on the facts of the example, supra note 8, the item was
properly treated as constructively received in 1990 but the taxpayer erroneously reported it
on her 1991 return instead of her 1990 return. A refund claim for 1991 filed between April
15, 1994 and April 15, 1995 will be timely and effective, even though the government is
then barred from collecting any deficiency properly due for 1990.
10 This can be seen by using the same basic facts of the examples, supra notes 8-9,
with a deduction substituted for an item of income.
" As to the basis of property received in a taxable transaction, see I.R.C. § 1012
(1988) (equating basis with cost); Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126
F. Supp. 184, 188 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (equating basis with fair market value); Treas. Reg. §
1.61-2(d)(2) (as amended in 1989) (requiring that property received as compensation for
services be included in income at its fair market value, and that such value be used as the
basis of the property).
12 Concerning the basis of property received in a nonrecognition transaction, see, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 1031(d) (1988) (providing that the basis of property exchanged solely for qualifying
like-kind property, is the same as the basis of the property exchanged by the taxpayer).
" Double inclusion of gain would result if, in a year now closed by the statute of
limitations, the taxpayer erroneously treated a nontaxable gain transaction as taxable.
Double exclusion of gain would occur if the taxpayer erroneously treated a taxable gain
transaction as nontaxable. For example, assume that during a now closed year, the taxpayer
(T) exchanged property A, having a basis of $10 and a fair market value of $100, for
property B, also having a fair market value of $100 and that this year, she sells property
B for its fair market value, which remains $100. If the earlier exchange was nontaxable,
but T erroneously treated it as taxable, reporting gain therefrom of $90, and is now required
[VOL. 80
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or a double allowance or disallowance of loss can
result. 14
The problems arising from prior uncorrected errors can also be
present with separate taxes. These problems, which appear in two
main instances, described immediately below, occur primarily be-
cause the federal tax system imposes a variety of taxes, one or more
of which may apply or appear to apply to a given transaction.
Because statutes of limitations are not always coordinated either
within a particular tax or among various taxes, the government or
the taxpayer may have a timely claim relating to one tax, while the
other party may have a time-barred claim concerning the other tax.
The first example of this situation occurs when two separate
taxes are imposed on the same transaction, item, or event. For
example, a taxpayer may have paid a particular tax, claim for
recovery of which is now time-barred; yet, the government may be
able to collect a different tax with respect to the same transaction
on a different theory under the statute of limitations applicable to
that tax. Of course, if the two taxes are properly applicable, the
to use a theoretically correct substituted basis of $10 for property B, she will have gain of
$90 this year, even though this amount represents the gain which she previously, but errone-
ously, reported in the year of the exchange. If, instead, the earlier exchange was taxable, but
T erroneously treated it as nontaxable, thus improperly excluding the gain therefrom of $90,
and is now allowed to use a theoretically correct fair market value basis of $100 for property
B, she will have no gain this year, even though she also failed to report the gain from the
transaction in the earlier year and had an overall economic gain of $90. See generally American
Light & Traction Co. v. Harrison, 142 F.2d 639, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding that although
taxpayer acquired bonds in a transaction erroneously treated as a nontaxable reorganization,
it could nevertheless use fair market value basis in determining gain on sale of bonds);
Philadelphia Park, 126 F. Supp. at 189-190 (holding that although taxpayer erroneously treated
a prior taxable transaction as nontaxable, such error did not preclude use of theoretically
correct fair market value basis of property so received).
"4 Double allowance of a loss would result if, in a year closed by the statute of
limitations, the taxpayer erroneously treated a nontaxable loss transaction as taxable. Double
disallowance of loss would occur if the taxpayer erroneously treated a taxable loss transaction
as nontaxable. For example, assume that during a now closed year, the taxpayer () exchanged
property A, having a basis of $100 and a fair market value of $10, for property B, also
having a fair market value of $10, and that this year, she sells property B for its fair market
value, which remains $10. If the earlier exchange was nontaxable, but T erroneously treated
it as taxable, reporting a loss therefrom of $90, and is now permitted to use a theoretically
correct substituted basis of $100 for property B, she will be allowed a loss of $90 this year,
even though this amount represents the same loss which she previously, but erroneously,
reported in the year of the exchange. If instead, the earlier exchange was taxable, but T
erroneously treated it as nontaxable, thus failing to deduct the loss therefrom of $90, and is
now required to use a theoretically correct fair market value basis of $10 for property B, she
will have no loss this year, even though she also failed to report the loss from the transaction
in the earlier year and had an overall economic loss of $90.
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imposition of each is correct and there is no error. 15 However,
some taxes are mutually exclusive: if one applies, the other can-
not. 16 Nevertheless, a strict application of the statutes of limitations
in such a situation would permit the government to collect one
tax, while barring the taxpayer from maintaining an action con-
cerning the other, even though both taxes arose out of the same
transaction.
The second example of this situation occurs when the two taxes
are not mutually exclusive, but are interrelated. The clearest illus-
tration involves the determination against an estate of a deficiency
in a decedent's income taxes. Such a deficiency is ordinarily de-
ductible as a claim against the estate and thus generally will reduce
federal estate tax liability. However, the income tax deficiency may
be administratively determined or judicially sustained after the close
of the limitations period for filing an estate tax refund claim.
Under a strict view of the statute of limitations, the government
could nevertheless collect the income tax deficiency in full even
though the estate is barred from claiming the related estate tax
overpayment. 17
In view of the foregoing considerations, it is not surprising that
relatively early on, courts recognized and developed various prin-
ciples to avoid inequities resulting from the strict application of
statutes of limitations in federal tax matters. 18 Congress also has
1, For example, it is proper to treat money received by a cash-basis taxpayer prior to
death both as income subject to income tax and as an asset of the gross estate subject to
federal estate tax. See Minskoff v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd, 490 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1974).
16 For example, an employer may be liable for taxes on the payment of wages under
either FICA, the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 415 (1954)
(codified in 26 U.S.C.), and FUTA, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, ch. 736, 68A
Stat. 439 (1954) (codified in 26 U.S.C.) or instead under RRTA, the Railroad Retirement
Tax Act ch. 428, 54 Stat. 596 (1940) (codified in 26 U.S.C.) but not under both. If the
employer erroneously files returns and pays FICA and FUTA taxes, rather than RRTA
taxes, the government may be able to proceed to collect RRTA taxes even though the
taxpayer may be barred by a statute of limitations from recovering the erroneously paid
FICA and FUTA taxes. See Andrews, Modern Day Equitable "Recoupment and the "Two
Tax Effect:" Avoidance of the Statutes of Limitation in Federal Tax Controversies, 28
AiZ. L. REv. 595, 630 (1986).
1, See infra text accompanying notes 97-106.
iS For an excellent judicial discussion of the development of the judicial doctrines
leading to the enactment in 1938 of the mitigation provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
see First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. United States, 565 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1977). In assessing
the problems that gave rise to such doctrines, the court there noted as follows:
Long ago the courts recognized that the statute of limitations could result in
severe inequities in the application of the income tax laws in individual cases.
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responded, 9 primarily through the mitigation provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, which alleviate some, but not all, of the
harsh consequences otherwise dictated by statutes of limitations. 20
This Article focuses on one of the judicial responses to per-
ceived inequities under the statutes of limitations in federal tax
cases: the doctrine of equitable recoupment. Equitable recoupment
This is because the income tax is based on separate and distinct taxpayers
paying tax on income in separate and distinct tax years. It is often difficult
to decide which taxpayer is chargeable with an item of income or deduction
in which tax year. As a result, correction of an error may be barred by the
limitations period before the proper treatment is determined and thus either
the taxpayer or the public revenues may lose.
Id. at 512. See also Andrews, supra note 16, at 615-23 (reviewing historical equities behind
theories of mitigation).
,1 Congress sometimes provides a credit to avoid the effects of unintended double
taxation. For example, an inter vivos transfer may be subject to federal gift tax, but the
property transferred also may be included properly in the transferor's gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes. However, Congress intended the gift tax to operate as an
adjunct to the estate tax, and did not intend to effect two exactions on the same transfer.
Therefore, I.R.C. § 2012 (1988), provides an estate tax credit for gift tax paid on pre-1976
transfers that are required to be included in the donor's gross estate for estate tax purposes.
Although the credit does not apply to gift taxes on post-1976 gifts, much the same result
is achieved under I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2) (1988), which effectively allows such gift taxes to be
subtracted in computing the amount of estate tax due. See R. STEPms, G. MAxFIELD &
S. LmND, FEDmERA EsTATE AND GIFr TAxATiON 3.04 (4th ed. 1978).
10 These "mitigation provisions" were added in 1954 and are contained at I.R.C. §§
1311-1314 (1988). In general, they operate where there is a determination (as defined in
I.R.C. § 1313) that confirms an erroneous prior treatment accorded a matter or transaction,
with its correction barred by the statute of limitations. See id. § 1311(a). These provisions
do not encompass all errors, but rather only those that involve a "circumstance of adjust-
ment" as described and defined in I.R.C. § 1312. Professor Willis, noting that they are
"one of the more intricate parts of the Code," has indicated that at least five, and often
seven, requirements must be satisfied in order to invoke statutory mitigation: (1) an error
must have occurred with regard to a particular year; (2) correction of the error must be
barred; (3) one of seven possible circumstances of adjustment (as defined in I.R.C. § 1312)
must exist; (4) a determination (as defined in I.R.C. § 1313) must exist that requires
treatment inconsistent with the treatment in question; (5) the proper relationship must exist,
at the proper time, between the taxpayer as to whom the determination was made and the
party with respect to whom the error occurred; and frequently, (6) the determination must
adopt a position maintained by a particular party; and, (7) the position adopted must be
inconsistent with the erroneous treatment. When these requirements are satisfied, the error
is corrected by an adjustment pursuant to I.R.C. § 1314, which generally reopens the year
in which the error occurred for a limited period and for the limited purpose of correcting
only the error in question or any other item affected thereby. See Willis, Some Limits of
Equitable Recoupment, Tax Mitigation, and Res Judicata: Reflections Prompted by Chert-
kof v. United States, 38 TAx LAw. 625, 630-633 (1985).
These provisions have been "unflatteringly described as being 'among the most arcane
and technical' as well as 'convoluted' provisions in the Internal Revenue Code." Andrews,
supra note 16, at 619 (citations omitted). For a discussion of their interrelationship with
the doctrine of equitable recoupment, see infra text accompanying notes 217-28.
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allows a party to use a tax related claim, barred by the statute of
limitations, as a defense to another party's timely tax related claim,
where the two claims arise out of the same transaction or taxable
event. 2' The Supreme Court first announced the doctrine, in the
federal tax area, in 1935 and shaped it, both procedurally and
substantively, in a series of subsequent decisions through 1946.
Recently, after a forty year hiatus during which equitable recoup-
ment had developed in the lower federal courts, the Court revisited
the doctrine in United States v. Dalm.22
In Dalm, the taxpayer received certain payments in 1976 and
1977, on which she paid gift but not income taxes. In 1983, when
the statute of limitations barred any gift tax refund claim, the
government determined income tax deficiencies relating to these
payments, by asserting that they were received as compensation
for services. The taxpayer petitioned the United States Tax Court,
where she eventually entered into a settlement partially sustaining
the income tax deficiencies. She paid the deficiencies and sued to
recover the amount of the previously paid gift tax. The district
court dismissed this suit, finding it barred by the statute of limi-
tations. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the doc-
trine of equitable recoupment supported the taxpayer's action. The
Supreme Court then reversed the court of appeals. In a 6-3 deci-
sion, written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that recoupment
must be raised in a timely filed suit and cannot provide an inde-
pendent basis for district court jurisdiction. 23
After reviewing the development of the doctrine of equitable
recoupment, its principal modem day features, and the main theory
underlying it, this Article examines the Supreme Court's decision
in Dalm. The Article suggests that although the majority's holding
is defensible in light of prior case law and applicable statutes, it
promises harsh consequences for taxpayers that may have a claim
for recoupment as a defense to an asserted deficiency determina-
tion, but wish to contest that deficiency in the United States Tax
Court (the sole forum in which they may do so before being
required to pay). Although the majority noted that Dalm did not
present the issue, heretofore it has been believed almost uniformly
21 As this article shows, the doctrine's primary applicability today is in cases involving
two different taxes, one of which is not income tax. See Andrews, supra note 16, at 623;
see also infra text accompanying notes 94-95.
2 -_ U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990).
11 For a discussion of this litigation, see infra Part III.
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that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to apply equitable recoup-
ment. Considering this fact, therefore, Dalm effectively requires
taxpayers that wish to avail themselves of equitable recoupment to
forgo their right to petition the Tax Court and instead to initially
challenge a deficiency determination in a United States District
Court or the United States Claims Court. Unlike the Tax Court,
however, those courts require full payment of an asserted deficiency
before suit, as a jurisdictional prerequisite4 Justice Stevens, dis-
senting in Dalm, argued that this situation confronts taxpayers
with "a Hobson's choice among competing fora, each of which
provides only half a remedy." 2s
This Article argues, in agreement with Justice Stevens, that
significant hardship and inequity inhere in this situation. However,
this Article also suggests that the course suggested by Justice Stev-
ens to avoid this result-permitting a taxpayer first to litigate a
deficiency in the Tax Court and, if unsuccessful, thereafter to
maintain a separate refund action based on recoupment-itself
raises numerous difficulties under existing decisional and statutory
law. Accordingly, this Article observes that amelioration of this
situation will have to come from Congress. In this regard, one
possible solution would be for Congress to grant the Tax Court
jurisdiction to apply equitable recoupment. In the interim, taxpay-
ers wishing to avail themselves of a recoupment claim will have to
be more circumspect than ever concerning their choice of forum
in responding to an asserted deficiency determination.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT IN THE
SUPREME COURT: 1935-1946
As noted earlier, equitable recoupment is a judicial doctrine
developed to avoid the inequity that would otherwise result from
strict adherence to statutes of limitations in federal tax matters.
Although it is similar to another such judicial device, setoff,26 it is
' See infra text accompanying notes 186, 240.
25 United States v. Dalm, __ U.S. , , 110 S. Ct. 1361, 1375 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
26 The federal tax doctrine of setoff originated in Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281
(1932), where an estate sought the refund of income taxes based on the government's
concededly erroneous disallowance of a deduction of over $16,000 for state inheritance
taxes. The government denied the claim because a re-audit revealed that a deduction of
over $20,000 for attorneys' fees had been improperly allowed in the same taxable year. The
Supreme Court permitted the government to deny the refund even though the statute of
1990-91]
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a distinct doctrine. The doctrine initially was shaped by a cluster
of Supreme Court decisions from 1935 through 1946. This Article
does not seek to undertake a comprehensive analysis of those
decisions, for that task has already been significantly accom-
plished. 27 However, no examination of the doctrine of equitable
recoupment is complete without some discussion of these deci-
sions .28
A. Bull v. United States
The doctrine of equitable recoupment "had its genesis in fed-
eral income tax matters" 29 in Bull v. United States.30 In Bull, the
taxpayer was the executor of the estate of a decedent who died in
February 1920. The decedent had been a member of a partnership,
from which his interest's share of profits for 1920 consisted of
approximately $24,000 accrued prior to his death and $212,000
accrued thereafter. Of this latter amount, the partnership paid over
$200,000 to the estate in 1920 with the remainder paid in 1921.
For federal estate tax purposes, the estate valued the decedent's
partnership interest at approximately $24,000, the value of the
decedent's pre-death share of profits. In 1921, the Commissioner
limitations barred the collection of a deficiency, stating:
An overpayment must appear before refund is authorized. Although the statute
of limitations may have barred the assessment and collection of any additional
sum, it does not obliterate the right of the United States to retain payments
already received when they do not exceed the amount which might have been
properly assessed and demanded.
Id. at 283. The doctrine of setoff thus permitted the government, within the taxpayer's
timely refund action, to consider the effects of the prior erroneous allowance of a deduction.
Although the government was precluded from collecting a deficiency based upon the error,
it could use the deficiency to show that, taking the error into account, the taxpayer had
not paid more tax than properly due and hence had made no "overpayment." See generally
Andrews, supra note 16, at 615 (discussing relationship between setoff and equitable re-
coupment). For a coherent judicial explanation of the differences between setoff and
equitable recoupment, see Dysart v. United States, 340 F.2d 624, 625-29 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
27 See Andrews, supra note 16; Willis, supra note 20.
Similarly, no article concerning equitable recoupment can proceed without acknowl-
edging the significant contributions of two recent works by Professors Andrews and Willis
that provide a helpful analytical framework and articulate the principal theory on which
equitable recoupment rests. See Andrews, supra note 16; Willis, supra note 20. Indeed, the
approach outlined in the Introduction of this Article, analyzing the effects of statutes of
limitations both within a single tax and between two taxes, is based upon the framework
constructed by Professor Andrews.
29Andrews, supra note 16, at 599. Because both the majority and dissenting dpinions
in Dalm closely examined Bull, this Article discusses it in detail.
- 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
[VOL. 80
EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT REVISITED
determined an estate tax deficiency on the then erroneous theory
that the post-death profits of approximately $212,000 were includ-
able in the gross estate. Pursuant to this determination, the estate
paid additional estate taxes of over $45,000 in June and August,
1921 .31
In July, 1925, the Commissioner issued the estate a notice of
a deficiency in income tax for 1920. This deficiency determination
was based partly on the Commissioner's inclusion in the estate's
income of the post-death partnership profits, which the estate had
received during that year but had omitted from its return, filed in
1921.32 The Board of Tax Appeals (the predecessor of the Tax
Court) upheld this inclusion, sustaining a deficiency in the estate's
income tax of over $55,000, which the executor paid, with interest
of about $8,000, in April, 1928.
In July, 1928, the executor filed a claim for refund of the
amount paid in April, 1928. When it was denied, he sued in the
Court of Claims on two alternative bases. 33 First, consistent with
having paid estate tax on the post-death partnership profits in 1921
under the Commissioner's estate tax deficiency determination, the
executor contended that the profits were an asset of the estate and
that their receipt was therefore not income. Accordingly, he re-
quested a refund of the income tax and interest (approximately
$63,000) paid in April, 1928. Alternatively, he contended that if
such profits were income for income tax purposes, then they were
incorrectly treated as an asset of the estate for estate tax purposes.
This alternative theory sought credit against the income tax defi-
ciency for the amount of estate tax paid in 1921 (approximately
$34,000) that was attributable to the erroneous inclusion of this
$200,000 as an asset of the estate, together with interest thereon.
The Court of Claims rejected the first claim, holding that the post-
31 Andrews, supra note 16, at 599. The Commissioner apparently included the profits
themselves, not simply the decedent's right to receive them in the gross estate. See infra
note 35.
31 A four year statute of limitations for refund claims then applied, and therefore,
when the notice of income tax deficiency was mailed to the estate, the period for filing a
claim for refund of the previously paid estate taxes had not expired. See Andrews, supra
note 16, at 601 n.27; infra text accompanying notes 120-30.
33 This procedural route, contesting a deficiency before the Board of Tax Appeals
(now the Tax Court), paying any deficiency there sustained and then bringing a refund
claim to recover the amount paid pursuant thereto, is now foreclosed by I.R.C. § 6512(a)
(1988). That section had its origin in § 1001(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, but was
inapplicable in Bull. See United States v. Daim, - U.S .... 110 S. Ct. 1361,
1365 n.4 (1990); Andrews, supra note 28, at 599 n.20.
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death partnership profits were properly subjected to federal income
tax, and denied the alternative claim because any suit for refund
of estate taxes was barred by the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Claims as to the
holding that such profits were income and properly subjected to
the income tax. It then addressed the "serious and difficult issue"
posed by the alternative claim, noting that if the same item had
indeed been subjected to both the income and estate taxes improp-
erly, the claim effectively sought to "redress the illegality and
injustice resulting from the erroneous inclusion of the sum in the
gross estate for estate tax." '34
The Court first rejected the government's argument that the
post-death profits could be both an estate asset and an item of
income, and the related contention that only the decedent's "right"
to receive such profits, rather than the profits themselves, were
subjected to the estate tax. To the contrary, it found that the
identical money had been taxed inconsistently under both the estate
tax and the income tax.35
Next, the Court considered the government's argument that
even if subjecting these profits to estate tax was error, its correction
was barred by the statute of limitations. The Court acknowledged
that when the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the income tax defi-
ciencies, it was too late to file a claim for refund of estate tax
based upon the erroneous inclusion of the partnership profits in
the gross estate, but noted, "[I]f the government should insist on
payment of the full deficiency of income tax, it would be in
possession of some $41,000 in excess of the sum to which it was
justly entitled. ' 36 While conceding that the estate's reliance upon
the Commissioner's erroneous determination in paying these addi-
tional estate taxes could not "avail to toll the statute of limitations,
which forbade the bringing of any action in 1930 for refund of
34 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 255 (1935).
31 The Court observed:
while... the same sum may in different aspects be used for the computation
of both an income and an estate tax, this fact will not here serve to justify
the Commissioner's rulings. They were inconsistent. The identical money-not
a right to receive the amount, on the one hand, and actual receipt resulting
from that right on the other-was the basis of two assessments. The double
taxation involved in this inconsistent treatment is made clear by the lower
court's finding ....
Id. at 256.
36 Id. at 258.
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the estate tax payments made in 1921 ,' 37 the Court nevertheless
found, in the doctrine of recoupment, a theory by which the
executor could "obtain redress in the present action for the unlaw-
ful retention of the money of the estate. ' 38 On that theory, the
Court held that the executor was entitled "to have credited against
the deficiency of income tax, the amount of his overpayment of
estate tax, with interest. . . .39
The Court characterized the tax collection process as the re-
covery by the sovereign of a just debt, in which the normal debt
collection procedure is reversed. In the Court's words, while "[t]he
ordinary defendant stands in judgment only after a hearing ...
[t]he taxpayer often is afforded his hearing after judgment and
after payment." 4 It thus analogized the position of a plaintiff-
taxpayer to that of a defendant in an action for recovery of a
debt. The Court acknowledged that although the government's
collection and retention of the excess estate tax was "against mo-
rality and conscience," since no timely claim or action for its
recovery had been instituted, "[I]f nothing further had occurred,
Congressional action would have been the sole avenue of re-
dress." ' 4' Here, however, something further had occurred; in 1925,
the government had sought to impose an income tax with respect
to the partnership profits that had previously been erroneously
subjected to estate tax. If the government had brought an action
at law to recover the income tax, the taxpayer could have raised a
defense of recoupment effectively. Consistent with its earlier anal-
ogy, the Court then permitted the taxpayer to rely upon that
doctrine, stating:
While here the money was taken through mistake without any
element of fraud, the unjust retention is immoral and amounts
in law to a fraud on the taxpayer's rights ... A claim for
recovery of money so held may not only be the subject of a suit
in the Court of Claims ... but may be used by way of recoup-
ment and credit in an action by the United States arising out of
the same transaction.... If the [same transaction] had been the
subject of a suit, any counter demand for recoupment... could
have been asserted notwithstanding.., the [fact that the] statute
17 Id. at 259.
3Id.
'9 Id. at 263.
• Id. at 260.
" Id. at 260-261.
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of limitations had barred an independent suit against the Govern-
ment therefor. This is because recoupment is in the nature of a
defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which
the plaintiff's action is grounded. Such a defense is never barred
• . .so long as the main action itself is timely .... It is immaterial
that . . . the taxpayer was required to pay the tax and afterwards
seek refundment .... This procedural requirement does not oblit-
erate his substantial right to rely on his cross-demand for the
credit of the amount which if the United States had sued him for
income tax he could have recouped against his liability on that
score. To the objection that the sovereign is not liable to respond
to the petitioner the answer is that it has given him a right of
credit or refund, which though he could not assert it in an action
brought by him in 1930, had accrued and was available to him
since it was actionable and not barred in 1925 when the Govern-
ment proceeded against him for the collection of income tax. 42
Thus, the Court in Bull permitted the taxpayer to use a time-
barred estate tax refund claim as a defense to the government's
timely asserted income tax deficiency claim where the two claims
arose out of the same transaction. Significantly, it did not permit
direct recovery of the barred estate tax itself, but instead permitted
recovery of an equal amount by way of a credit against the income
tax paid pursuant to the Commissioner's deficiency determina-
tion. 4
3
B. Stone v. White
In 1937, slightly two years after Bull, the Court applied equi-
table recoupment in favor of the government in Stone v. White.
44
Framing the issue as, "whether . . . testamentary trustees, who
have paid a tax on the income of the trust estate, which should
have been paid by the beneficiary, are entitled to recover the tax,
although the government's claim against the beneficiary has been
barred by the statute of limitations, '45 the Court held that the
42 Id. at 261-263.
41 Concerning this relief, see infra text accompanying notes 100, 118-19.
- 301 U.S. 532 (1937).
4, Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 533 (1937). In Stone, the beneficiary omitted the
trust income from her 1928 return. The Court stated, "A deficiency against the trustees
was assessed by the Commissioner before, and was paid by them, under protest, from
income of the trust, after collection from the beneficiary had been barred by the statute of
limitations." Id. After the statute had run, the Supreme Court decided Commissioner v.
Butterworth, 290 U.S. 365 (1933), which held that such income should be taxed entirely to
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government could use its time-barred deficiency claim against the
trust's sole beneficiary as a defense to the trustees' timely refund
action. While recognizing that the trust and the beneficiary were
distinct taxpayers, the Court stated that a "court of equity takes
cognizance of the identity in interest of trustee and cestui que
trust,' "'46 and "whenever the trustee brings suit in a court which is
free to consider equitable rights and duties, his right to maintain
the suit may be enlarged or diminished by reference to the fact
that the suit, though maintained in the name of the trustee alone,
is for the benefit and in the equitab~le interest of the cestui."'47 It
concluded, "No injustice is done ... by withholding from the
trustees money which in equity is the beneficiary's, and which the
government received in payment of a tax which was hers to pay." 48
The Court also rejected the trustees' argument based upon
sections 607 and 609 of the Revenue Act of 1928, which the trustees
claimed "prohibit[ed] 'credit of an overpayment against a barred
deficiency."' 49 Noting that these statutes "preclude in a suit by the
taxpayer against the collector or the government, reliance on a
claim against the taxpayer barred by statute, as a set-off, or coun-
terclaim," it found that "demand made upon the trustees was not
barred by the statute ' 50 and considered it unreasonable to construe
the statute as depriving the government of "defenses based on
special equities establishing its right to withhold a refund from the
demanding taxpayer." 5 ' The government's defense was "not a set-
off or a counterclaim, but ... an equitable reason, growing out
the beneficiary; the trustees' refund suit was based on the decision in that case. This portion
of the opinion was amended pursuant to the Order of the Court of October 11, 1937. See
Reporter's Note, 301 U.S. at 539. Prior to amendment, the opinion had indicated that both
the Commissioner's deficiency determination against the trustees and their payment of the
tax had occurred before collection of the tax from the beneficiary had been barred by the
statute of limitations.
,4 Stone, 301 U.S. at 537.
• Id. at 536.
8 Id. at 537.
49 Id. at 538. But see infra text accompanying notes 55-58, 60 (discussing McEachern
v. Rose, 302 U.S. 56 (1937), which supported this argument, but distinguished the facts in
Stone).
'0 Stone, 301 U.S. at 538. The Court probably meant that the government's deter-
mination of an income tax deficiency against the trustees was not itself barred by the statute
of limitations when made. But, it also could have meant that at the time of that determi-
nation, the statute of limitations on determining a deficiency against the beneficiary had
also not yet expired, an assertion which seems correct. See supra note 45.
11 Stone, 301 U.S. at 538-39.
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of the circumstances of the erroneous payment, why petitioners
ought not to recover. "52 Finally, the Court stated:
Here the defense is not a counter demand on petitioners, but a
denial of their equitable right to undo a payment which, though
effected by an erroneous procedure, has resulted in no unjust
enrichment to the government, and in no injury to petitioners or
their beneficiary. The government, by retaining the tax paid by
the trustees, is not reviving a stale claim. Its defense, which
inheres in the cause of action, is comparable to an equitable
recoupment or diminution of petitioners' right to recover. "Such
a defense is never barred by the statute of limitations so long as
the main action itself is timely." Bull v. United States. 3
Stone thus extended the availability of equitable recoupment to
the government, and, by allowing the use of a time-barred defi-
ciency claim against the beneficiary as a defense to a timely refund
claim of the trustees, established that the doctrine can apply in
cases involving different taxpayers that have an "identity in inter-
est." 5
4
C. McEachern v. Rose
Despite its apparent extension of equitable recoupment in Stone,
the Court dealt the doctrine a near mortal blow, later that same
year, in McEachern v. Rose.55 In McEachern, the taxpayer was the
administrator of the estate of a decedent that died during 1928.
The decedent had sold stock on the installment method in 1924,
pursuant to which he would report one-tenth of the total gain then
and in each of the nine succeeding years. After his death, the estate
continued to report gain in this manner, albeit erroneously, because
then-applicable law required recognition of gain on the disposition
of the obligation at death, generally rendering subsequent install-
ments under the obligation non-taxable. On ascertaining the error,
the estate timely sought income tax refunds for 1929 through 1931.
The government asserted that the administrator was not equitably
entitled to the refund because he had failed to report gain on the
disposition of the installment obligation, thus underpaying the
52 Id. at 538-39.
Id. at 539 (quoting Bull, 295 U.S. at 262).
4 Id. at 537.
5$ 302 U.S. 56 (1937).
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resulting 1928 tax liability, although assessment of a deficiency for
that year was barred by the statute of limitations.
The Court indicated, "We may assume that ... equitable
principles would preclude recovery in the absence of any statutory
provision requiring a different result. But Congress has set limits
to the extent to which courts might otherwise go in curtailing a
recovery of overpayments of taxes because of the taxpayer's failure
to pay other taxes which might have been but were not assessed
against him."' 56 It concluded that sections 607 and 609 of the
Revenue Act of 1928 precluded the government from crediting the
unpaid, but time-barred tax due for 1928 against the overpayments
for 1929 through 1931,57 treating those sections as evidence of
Congress' intent "to require refund to the taxpayer of an overpay-
ment, even though he has failed to pay taxes for other. periods,
whenever their collection is barred by limitation.' '5 In closing, the
Court undertook to distinguish Stone v. White, in which it had
held these same provisions inapplicable.5 9
By precluding use of the barred 1928 income tax deficiency as
a defense to the administrator's 1929-1931 refund claims, the Court
appeared to have dramatically limited the reach of Bull and Stone,
and thus left in question the continued viability of the doctrine of
equitable recoupment 0
56 McEachern, 302 U.S. at 59-60.
11 The Court described the operation of these sections as follows:
Section 607 of the 1928 Act declares that any payment of a tax after expiration
of the period of limitation shall be considered an overpayment and directs
that it be "credited or refunded to the taxpayer if claim therefor is filed within
the period of limitation for filing such claim"; and § 609 (a) of the 1928 Act
provides that "Any credit against a liability in respect of any taxable year
shall be void if any payment in respect of such liability would be considered
an overpayment under section 607." These provisions preclude the Government
from taking any benefit from the taxpayer's overpayment by crediting it
against an unpaid tax whose collection has been barred by limitation.
Id. at 60. These sections find their modem-day counterparts in I.R.C §§ 6401, 6514(a)-(b)
(1988).
11 McEachern, 302 U.S. at 62.
59 The court stated regarding Stone:
The assessment of a deficiency against the trustees and the payment of it by
them were not barred by limitation. Hence, § 607 did not compel a recovery.
Section 609 did not require it. The commissioner neither sought, nor did §
322, regardless of any period of limitation, permit him to credit the amount
which the one taxpayer had paid against the tax which another should have
paid. Equitable considerations not within the reach of the statutes denied a
recovery. It was enough, in the peculiar facts of the case, that the trustees
had suffered no burden and that the Government was not unjustly enriched.
Id. at 63.
6 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 606; Willis, supra note 20, at 636-638.
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D. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.
In 1946, the Court decided Rothensies v. Electric Storage Bat-
tery Co. 61 There, the taxpayer erroneously paid excise taxes from
1919 to 1926. In 1926, it filed a claim for refund, which, because
the statute of limitations then barred a claim for years prior to
1922, sought recovery only of the excise taxes paid between 1922
and 1926.
The government refunded these sought-after excise taxes in
1935. Thereafter, the Commissioner determined an income tax
deficiency for 1935 on the tax benefit theory, asserting that since
these excise taxes had previously been deducted for income tax
purposes, their recovery gave rise to taxable income. The taxpayer
paid this income tax deficiency and then sought to have it refunded.
The district court and court of appeals agreed with the government
that the excise tax refund was income, but allowed the taxpayer to
recoup the barred excise tax overpayments for 1919 through 1922
against the 1935 income tax deficiency. "The gravity of this hold-
ing" led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and reverse. 62
The Court observed that there was no "statutory warrant for
allowing barred tax refund claims by way of recoupment or oth-
erwise," and that the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1928
"seem[ed]" to direct the opposite result.6 3 Citing Bull and Stone
as the principal authorities for the doctrine, it emphasized that
equitable recoupment is,
"in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the
transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is grounded." It has
never been thought to allow one transaction to be offset against
another, but only to permit a transaction which is made the
subject of suit by a plaintiff to be examined in all its aspects,
and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one
transaction as a whole.64
6, 329 U.S. 296 (1946).
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299 (1946).
63 Electric Storage Battery, 329 U.S. at 299 & n.1. However, unlike in McEachern,
the Court did not rely upon those provisions, which it mentioned only by a "cf." reference
in a footnote. This fact has led courts and commentators to conclude that Electric Storage
Battery revived the doctrine in limited form. See Andrews, supra note 16, at 606-613 ("If
equitable recoupment 'died' after McEachern, Electric Storage Battery created a remarkable
'Lazarus effect."'); Willis, supra note 20, at 638-40.
6' Electric Storage Battery, 329 U.S. at 299 (citation omitted) (quoting Bull, 295 U.S.
at 262).
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Stressing that in Bull and Stone, both the main claims and the
recoupment claims involved a "single taxable event," the Court
"declin[ed] to expand the doctrine beyond the facts" of those
cases .65 It characterized statutes of limitations as "almost indispen-
sable elements of fairness [and] practical administration of an
income tax policy." ' 66 While the Court conceded that equity-minded
judges might seek to grant relief from their operation in individual
cases, it concluded:
[I]f we should approve a doctrine of recoupment of the breadth
here applied we would seriously undermine the statute of limita-
tions in tax matters.... Every assessment of deficiency and each
claim for refund would invite a search of the taxpayer's entire
tax history for items to recoup. This case provides evidence of
the extent to which this would go. When this suit was brought
in 1943, the claim pleaded as a recoupment was for taxes collected
over twenty years before and for over sixteen years barred by the
statute. That claims dead so long can be resurrected under this
doctrine, is enough to show its menace to the statute of limita-
tions-at least as to those taxpayers whose affairs by accident or
design take such shape that they can avail themselves of recoup-
ment remedies .... We cannot approve such encroachments on
the policy of the statute out of consideration for a taxpayer who
for many years failed to file or prosecute its refund claim. If
there are to be exceptions to the statute of limitations, it is for
Congress rather than for the courts to create and limit them.67
E. Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co.
Within this doctrinally formative period, which lasted from
1935 to 1946, the Supreme Court also confirmed, in Commissioner
v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co.,68 that the Board of Tax Appeals,
the predecessor of the Tax Court,6 9 lacked jurisdiction to apply
equitable recoupment. In Gooch, the Commissioner determined an
overassessment for 1935 and a corresponding deficiency for 1936.70
63 Id. at 300-01.
6 Id. at 301.
67 Id. at 302-03.
-, 320 U.S. 418 (1943).
69 The court noted that the Revenue Act of 1942 changed the Board's name to The
Tax Court of the United States, but was not intended to alter its then existing jurisdiction.
Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418, 418 n.1 (1943).
70 The taxpayer overvalued its closing inventory for 1935 and its corresponding opening
inventory for 1936. For 1935, these errors decreased the taxpayer's cost of goods sold and
increased its gross income from sales, and for 1936, increased its cost of goods sold and
decreased its gross income from sales. Id. at 419.
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The taxpayer appealed to the Board, requesting a credit for the
amount of the 1935 overassessment, refund of which was barred
by the statute of limitations, against the 1936 deficiency. The Board
had held that it lacked jurisdiction to grant this relief and the
Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, agreed, 7' finding that "[t]he Board [was] but 'an inde-
pendent agency in the Executive branch of the government,' and
the legislative pattern of its jurisdiction clear and unambiguous. 72
Section 272(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 confined the
board's jurisdiction to a determination of the amount of a defi-
ciency or overpayment for the particular tax year as to which the
Commissioner had determined a deficiency and as to which the
taxpayer sought review.7 3 Here, the taxpayer sought to use the 1935
overpayment "not as an aid in redetermining the 1936 deficiency,
but as an affirmative defense or offset to that deficiency," requir-
ing the board to make a determination outside its jurisdiction under
section 272(g).7 4 Allowing "an equitable defense which of necessity
is based upon a determination foreign to the Board's jurisdiction
would be contrary to the expressed will of Congress. ' 75 The Court
71 While the Supreme Court's review of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Gooch was
pending, the Tax Court decided Elbert v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 892 (1943), involving the
same taxpayers and arising out of the same facts as Elbert v. Johnson, 164 F.2d 421 (2d
Cir. 1947), aff'g 69 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), which is discussed infra notes 111 and
257. There, a gift tax had been paid on the transfers of funds to certain trusts. The
Commissioner later determined that the transfers lacked substance and that the income of
the trusts was taxable to the transferors. The transferor-taxpayers contended that they
should be allowed to recoup the previously paid gift tax against the income tax deficiencies,
relying on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Gooch. The Tax Court denied relief, adhering
to its prior position that it lacked jurisdiction to apply equitable recoupment. Elbert, 2 T.C.
at 895. It further indicated that if it had such jurisdiction, it would hold that recoupment
was precluded, relying on McEachern v. Rose and the statutes cited therein. Id. at 895-896.
72 Gooch Milling, 320 U.S. at 420 (quoting Internal Revenue Code, ch. 5, 53 Stat.
158 (1939)).
73 Section 272(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which originated as § 274(g)
of the Revenue Act of 1926, provided:
The Board in redetermining a deficiency in respect of any taxable year shall
consider such facts with relation to the taxes for other taxable years as may
be necessary correctly to redetermine the amount of such deficiency, but in so
doing shall have no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the tax for any
other taxable year has been overpaid or underpaid.
I.R.C. § 6214(b) (1988) is the virtually identical modern-day counterpart to this statute
and applies to the Tax Court.
74 Gooch Milling, 320 U.S. at 421. The Court, citing Bull, emphasized that equitable
"recoupment is in the nature of a defense to some feature of the transaction upon which
the plaintiff's action is grounded." Id. n.6.
11 Id. at 421. The Court acknowledged that in Appeal of E.J. Barry, 1 B.T.A. 156
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noted that the case did not implicate "the scope of equitable
recoupment when it is asserted in a suit for refund of taxes in
tribunals possessing general equity jurisdiction,' '76 emphasizing that
in cases before the Board, applicability of the doctrine was circum-
scribed by its limited jurisdiction:
The Internal Revenue Code, not general equitable principles, is
the mainspring of the Board's jurisdiction. Until Congress deems
it advisable to allow the Board to determine the overpayment or
underpayment in any taxable year other than the one for which
a deficiency has been assessed, the Board must remain impotent
when the plea of equitable recoupment is based upon an over-
payment or underpayment in such other year.77
SUMMARY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S RECOUPMENT DECISIONS FROM
1935-1946
The Supreme Court's equitable recoupment decisions between
1935 and 1946 defined the early substantive and procedural limits
of the doctrine. Substantively, the doctrine was announced in Bull
v. United States, which permitted the taxpayer to reduce the amount
of the government's timely asserted income tax deficiency claim by
the amount of a barred overpayment claim with respect to estate
tax erroneously imposed on the same transaction.78 Stone v. White
expanded the doctrine by allowing the government to use an oth-
erwise barred income tax deficiency claim as a defense to a suit
for an income tax refund brought on behalf of the sole beneficiary
of a trust.7 9 McEachern v. Rose jeopardized the doctrine's status
by giving precedence to statutes that precluded the crediting of a
time-barred deficiency against a timely overpayment. 80 However,
the doctrine appeared to undergo a limited revival in Rothensies
v. Electric Storage Battery Co., where the Court emphasized the
single transaction requirement and declined to expand the doc-
(1924), the board had applied an overpayment for a year in which the Commissioner had
not determined a deficiency against a deficiency determined by the Commissioner for another
year, but noted, "Soon thereafter, however, Congress passed 274(g) of the Revenue Act of
1926 ... taking such jurisdiction away from the Board." Gooch Milling, 320 U.S. at 421
n.6 (emphasis added).
76 Gooch Milling, 320 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 422.
71 See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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trine's scope beyond the facts of Bull and Stone.8" Procedurally,
Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co. held that section
272(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 deprived the Board
of Tax Appeals (and by implication, its successor, the Tax Court
of the United States) of jurisdiction to allow recoupment of a
taxpayer's barred overpayment claim against the government's timely
asserted deficiency claim.8 2
II. THE MODERN DAY FEATURES OF EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.,83 marked the Su-
preme Court's most recent treatment of the issue of equitable
recoupment prior to its decision in United States v. Dalm.84 The
doctrine, however, continued to develop in the lower federal courts.
The following section discusses some of the salient features of
modern day equitable recoupment as it has evolved.85
A. Survival of Recoupment and the Effects of Subsequent
Judicial and Statutory Developments
Despite the doubts raised by McEachern v. Roses6 and, to a
lesser extent, Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co. ,87 the lower
federal courts have generally concluded, albeit "with some trepi-
dation,"85 that the doctrine of equitable recoupment continues to
survive. 89 Subsequent statutory and judicial developments have,
1, See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
83 329 U.S. 296 (1946).
" __ U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990).
' For a comprehensive analysis of modern day equitable recoupment, see generally
Andrews, supra note 16.
302 U.S. 56 (1937).
329 U.S. 296 (1946).
See Andrews, supra note 16, at 612.
See generally Andrews, supra note 16, at 611-613; Willis, supra note 20, at 636-
638, 640. Some judges found it difficult to reconcile McEachern with Bull v. United States,
295 U.S. 247 (1935), and Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937). See American Light and
Traction Co. v. Harrison, 142 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1942). In American Light, relying upon
McEachern, the court refused to allow a barred deficiency claim, arising from the taxpayer's
erroneous treatment of a transaction as a nontaxable reorganization, to be recouped against
a timely refund claim based on the taxpayer's use of a fair market value basis in the
property acquired in the transaction. A dissenting judge indicated that he had "not been
able to fully and satisfactorily reconcile" Bull and McEachern, stating, "[T]he inferior
courts have been quite generally confused by the two holdings." Id. at 643-44 (Evans, J.,
dissenting). See also Lyeth v. Hoey, 112 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1940). In Lyeth, the court relied
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however, altered the doctrine's precise applicability to the facts
presented by the formative Supreme Court cases. For example, it
is no longer possible, as it was in Bull v. United States, first to
contest a deficiency before the Tax Court, pay any deficiency there
sustained, and sue for a refund of that same tax in the Claims
Court or a federal district court.9° Under current law, it also does
not appear improper to subject post-death partnership profits to
both estate tax and income tax as was done in Bull.91 Furthermore,
the mitigation provisions now purport to address the situation
presented in Stone v. White, where the statute of limitations, if
strictly applied, would result in the double exclusion of income by
related parties, as well as similar situations where recoupment might
once have prevailed. 92
upon McEachern to preclude the government from recouping a barred estate tax claim
against taxpayer's timely income tax claim. A dissenting judge stated, "The interesting, if
difficult, problem here presented requires us first to interpret and reconcile Supreme Court
decisions which the Court itself does not regard as conflicting." Id. at 8-9 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). See also Kojes v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 762, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (denying
recoupment based on lack of single transaction, but commenting, "No persuasive reason
seems to have been advanced as to why McEachern v. Rose does not hold that recoupment
in tax cases is no longer available, although several have been offered"). Cf. Wood v.
United States, 213 F.2d 660, 661 (2nd Cir. 1954) ("The gap in statutes of limitation created
by the recoupment doctrine in tax cases seemed at one time to be fairly wide. But the gap
has been narrowed markedly by McEachern v. Rose and Rothensies v. Electric Storage
Battery Co. Frankly we do not know just how much of that doctrine still lives. But we
think it lacks all vitality unless there has occurred a 'single taxable event."') (citations
omitted).
Nevertheless, lower federal courts have generally assumed that the doctrine survives,
"but with ... no adherence to McEachern. Why later courts do not simply reject the case
is unclear: to do so would seem preferable to and more honest than ignoring it." Willis,
supra note 20, at 640. See Estate of Mann v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 1132, 1142 (N.D.
Tex. 1982), aff'd, 731 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying government's recoupment claim
on the merits, but finding that modern counterparts to the statutes relied on in McEachern
do not preclude a claim for equitable recoupment by either the government or the taxpayer
and noting that McEachern has generally not been followed). For recent efforts to reconcile
the cases, see Andrews, supra note 16, at 611-613; Willis, supra note 28, at 636-638.
See infra text accompanying note 257.
See I.R.C. § 691 (1988) (concerning income in respect of a decedent); see also
Andrews, supra note 16, at 627-628; Willis, supra note 20, at 635 n.77. However, equitable
recoupment may apply in a similar setting. See Boyle v. United States, 355 F.2d 233 (3d
Cir. 1965), rev'g 232 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1964) (where preferred stock dividend arrearages
were erroneously included in valuing a decedent's gross estate, and the Commissioner
subsequently subjected the estate's beneficiaries to income taxes on their receipt of the
dividends, the court, relying on Bull, allowed the beneficiaries to recoup the barred estate
tax overpayment against their income tax deficiencies).
If all pertinent criteria are satisfied, the mitigation provisions would now grant
relief in cases like Stone involving an erroneous double exclusion of income between related
parties, correction of which would be barred by the statute of limitations. See I.R.C. §§
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B. Continuing Lessons from the Supreme Court's Equitable
Recoupment Cases
1. The "Single Transaction" Requirement
Many of the lessons of the Court's early cases have retained
their vigor. Paramount among these is the requirement, first artic-
ulated in Bull and later reaffirmed in Electric Storage Battery, that
the main claim and the recoupment claim must arise out of the
same transaction or taxable event. Following the decision in Electric
Storage Battery, courts have construed that requirement narrowly.93
1312(3), 1313(c)(4) (1988). Subject to qualifications and limitations, the mitigation provisions
substantially correct those problems that result within the income tax from the statutes of
limitations' bar to the correction of error, as described in the introductory section of this
Article (i.e., the double inclusion or exclusion of items of income, and the double allowance
or disallowance of deductions or credits). See generally I.R.C. §§ 1312(l)-(4) (1988). They
would also correct the basis related problems described in Philadelphia Park Amusement
Co. v. United States, and American Light and Traction Co. v. Harrison, discussed supra,
note 13. See I.R.C. § 1312(7) (1988). Concerning the relationship of the mitigation provisions
to equitable recoupment, see infra text accompanying notes 218-32.
11 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 612. Cases interpreting this single transaction
requirement include Wood v. United States, 213 F.2d 660 (2d. Cir 1954), in which the
taxpayers purchased bonds in 1944 and sold them in 1945. Their timely refund claim for
1944, based on incorrect disallowance of a deduction for amortization of bond premiums,
was upheld and the Commissioner was not permitted to recoup against this, a barred
deficiency for 1945, even though it resulted fron the failure to reduce the basis of the
bonds by the amount of the deduction. The court held that there was no single transaction,
but "two such events ... the purchase of bonds in one taxable year and ... their sale in
another." Id. at 661. Accord Twitchco, Inc. v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ala.
1972) (barring deficiencies stemming from taxpayer's incorrect tax treatment on the "pur-
chase" of building as ground for recoupment against timely refund claim relating to tax
treatment on sale of building); Elliff v. United States, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9281
(D. Or. 1986) (holding that taxpayer could not recoup barred overpayments from some
years against timely asserted deficiencies for other years, even though both related to income
from personal services, since personal services rendered in different taxable years are not a
single transaction); Florida Memorial Cemetery v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH)
9608 (D. Fla 1972) (holding that deficiencies resulting from understatement of gain on
sales of cemetery lots could not be recouped against timely refund claims based on over-
statement of gain on sales of lots in other years); See also Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v.
United States, 245 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (indicating that single transaction lacking
where overpayment and deficiencies arose out of depreciation of equipment purchased in
different years); Robinson v. United States, 60-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9587 (E.D. Ark.
1960) (holding that single transaction absent where barred deficiency arose from taxpayer
claiming depreciation deductions for property owned by a partnership, and overpayment
arose from treatment of gain on sale of partnership interest); cf. American Cement Corp.
v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (deciding that where three independent
corporations, each engaged in unrelated tax controversies with the government, merged, the
government could not recoup deficiencies owed by one of the corporations against any
refund due to another, where issues giving rise to the deficiency and the refund claims were
unrelated).
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Because the mitigation provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
currently address situations in which the barred erroneous treat-
ment and the timely correct treatment both involve income tax,
94
Professor Andrews has observed that modern day equitable re-
coupment plays its greatest role in cases involving "two different
taxes ... at least one of which is not income tax." '9 5 In such
situations, he discerns two types of cases, or "models," in which
the single transaction requirement generally will be satisfied. Under
the first, the two taxes bear the same type of "either-or, but not
both" relationship that was present in Bull.96 Under this so-called
"Bull model," the two taxes, when imposed on the same transac-
tion, are mutually inconsistent; if one of the taxes is determined
to be correct, then the other must by definition be deemed incorrect
in its entirety. The second, or "Herring-Bowcut model," derived
from United States v. Herring97 and United States v. Bowcut 98 is
somewhat more complex. In this type of case, although the two
taxes are not mutually inconsistent, "there is such a statutory
interrelationship between two different taxes that a determination
with respect to ... one tax can automatically produce ... [a
particular] result as to the other tax." 99
In both Herring and Bowcut, the taxpayer-estates were permit-
ted to recoup time-barred estate tax refund claims against the
government's timely asserted deficiencies concerning a decedent's
income taxes. As noted earlier, such deficiencies generally are
deductible as claims against the estate, ultimately reducing estate
tax liability.
In Herring, the Commissioner issued a preliminary notice de-
termining income tax deficiencies, regarding the decedent, before
the period in which to file an estate tax claim expired, but did not
assess these deficiencies until afterward. Almost immediately after
the assessment, the estate commenced suit for a refund of the
estate taxes that would have been saved had the income tax defi-
ciencies been deducted, but the district court dismissed this suit as
untimely. 00 After paying the income tax deficiencies, the executrix
-, See infra text accompanying notes 230-31.
91 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 648.
96 Id. at 623-24, 627. In Bull, either income or estate tax, but not both, properly
applied to the post-death partnership profits. Id. at 627-28.
240 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'g 140 F. Supp. 930 (E.D.N.C. 1956).
91 287 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1961), aff'g 175 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mont. 1959).
99 Andrews, supra note 16, at 630.
-c Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1955).
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again commenced a refund suit, this time for refund of the income
tax paid. This suit asserted the theory, suggested by the district
court in dismissing her earlier action, that the overpaid estate tax
should be recouped against these income taxes. The district court
held for the taxpayer and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, relying on
Bull and rejecting the government's arguments based on Mc-
Eachern v. Rose and related statutes. The Court stated:
It is true that in the Bull case both claims grew out of the same
transaction and were asserted against the same money in the
hands of the executor; but that, in practical effect, is the situation
that prevails here. The Government has asserted two claims against
the monies of the estate that came into the hands of the admin-
istratrix-one on account of past due income taxes and the other
on account of the estate tax due on the net estate, and it is
impossible to determine the amount of the latter without making
due allowance for the deduction caused by the former. In one
respect, the equities in favor of the taxpayer are stronger here
than in the Bull case, for in the latter the time for filing a claim
for refund of the estate tax had not expired when the income tax
was assessed, whereas in the pending case the income tax was not
assessed until after the refund of the estate tax was barred. 01
A comparable result was reached on substantially similar facts
in Bowcut10 2 where the district court, relying on Herring, rejected
the government's argument, not renewed on appeal, that the single
transaction requirement was not satisfied.0 3 Significantly, the Ninth
Circuit spurned the government's contention that because the in-
come tax deficiency was assessed approximately five weeks before
the expiration of the period in which to file an estate tax refund
101 United States v. Herring, 240 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1957).
102 United States v. Bowcut, 287 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1961). In Herring and Bowcut, the
estates initially paid the asserted income tax deficiencies and brought income tax refund
suits in district court, where they sought to recoup the time-barred estate tax overpayments.
For cases denying recoupment where the estate first contested the income tax deficiencies
in Tax Court, see Kojes v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), and Holzer
v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Wisc. 1966), aff'd, 367 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966)
(per curiam), holding that since the income tax deficiencies had been litigated in the Tax
Court, the predecessor of I.R.C. § 6514(a) (1988) precluded a subsequent income tax refund
suit.
103 Bowcut, 175 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mont. 1959), aff'd, 287 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1962).
Although the Service initially denied equitable recoupment for lack of a single taxable
transaction or event, it now agrees that recoupment will be available in these circumstances.
See Rev. Rul. 71-56, 1971-1 C.B. 404, revoking Rev. Rul. 55-226, 1955-1 C.B. 469. For a
discussion, see Andrews, supra note 16, at 637.
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claim, recoupment should be denied because of the taxpayer's lack
of diligence. The court found the same scenario in Bull, yet "eq-
uitable relief was not denied for this reason."' 4 The Court further
stated, "It is apparently not the diligence of the taxpayer as to his
legal rights which controls, but rather the inequity of holding that,
while the government's rights under a transaction continue unim-
paired, its adversary's rights thereunder are barred by limita-
tions."' 05 Thus; on the Herring-Bowcut model, the single transaction
requirement generally will be satisfied where the two taxes bear
this type of relationship.' °6
114 Herring, 287 F.2d at 657.
105 Id.
106 But see Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 703 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (denying
recoupment even though the case involved "nothing more than the government's side of
equitable recoupment in the same context as Herring-Bowcut"); Andrews, supra note 16,
at 641. In Wilmington Trust, the Commissioner had determined pre-death income tax
deficiencies, with respect to two decedents, which were paid by their estates. In one of three
consolidated cases, Wilmington Trust, the executor claimed and obtained an estate tax
refund based on deduction of the deficiencies for estate tax purposes. In another, McMullan
v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9656 (Ct. Cl. 1978), the executor deducted
the income tax deficiencies on the estate tax return. Each estate then sought a refund of
the income taxes thus paid. The trial judge found each estate entitled to the refunds claimed,
but held that since these income taxes had been deducted for estate tax purposes, the
government could recoup the amount of the estate tax savings attributable to such deduc-
tions. In McMullan, the Trial Judge acknowledged that this situation was not precisely like
Bull but, recognizing the theory of the Herring-Bowcut model, concluded that the single
transaction requirement was satisfied:
There are instances ... when the adjustment of one tax automatically affects
another tax of the same or related taxpayers. The case at bar is such an
instance.... To be sure, the underlying income tax dispute (i.e, the proper
treatment of forest management expenses) by itself has no immediate relevance
to the estate tax liability. To that extent this case differs somewhat from the
Bull case where the basic controversy ... was simultaneously an income tax
issue and an estate tax issue. But this fine distinction is not enough, in and
of itself, to require a different result in this case. In both cases, the resolution
of the underlying dispute necessarily affects both income and estate tax lia-
bility.
McMullan, 78-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9656, at 85, 184 (Trial Judge Browne's
opinion). On review, however, the Court of Claims in Wilmington Trust rejected this view
and held that the single transaction requirement was not satisfied, stating:
The income tax refund is based on the deductibility ... of the timber operations
expenses. The estate tax deficiency however, exists because the estate deducted
the additional income taxes reflecting those expenses that it paid and now is
recovering. The recoupment claim thus arises from a different transaction (the
reduced deduction from the estate tax) than the refund claims (the increased
deductions from ordinary income). The government is not seeking to offset
against each other two taxes levied on the same transaction, but to offset the
tax on one transaction against the tax on another. This, it cannot do.
Wilmington Trust, 610 F.2d at 714. The Court of Claims thus disagreed that the interde-
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2. Recoupment and Related Parties
In Stone v. White,'0 7 the Court permitted recoupment of the
government's time-barred deficiency claim, concerning a sole trust
beneficiary, against a timely refund claim brought by the trustees.
Thus, according to Stone, a claim against one taxpayer could be
raised as a defense to a claim brought by another, so long as the
two taxpayers had an "identity in interest."' 0 8 This analysis gen-
erally has been applied to permit recoupment where there is a strict
identity of interest between the parties and to deny it where the
parties may have divergent interests.1°9
pendency of the two taxes was sufficient to permit equitable recoupment. It also hinted
that one relevant inquiry "may be" whether the party asserting recoupment had a fair
opportunity to bring suit to recover the tax before the statute ran, and found that "to
whatever extent this factor may be relevant," it militated against recoupment, as in the case
where the government could have asserted timely estate tax deficiencies after the respective
estates sought the income tax refunds. This decision is discussed and criticized by Andrews,
supra note 16, at 637-47. At least in the McMullan case, involved in Wilmington Trust, the
government ultimately raised a successful defense to the estate's income tax refund claim
for 1972, although it was not based upon recoupment. In a later decision, the Court of
Claims found that because the estate's attorneys had represented that it would repay any
resulting estate tax liability if it eventually obtained a refund of the income taxes, the estate
was equitably estopped from "recovering an amount equal to the necessary adjustment to
the estate tax liability resulting from any reduction in 1972 income taxes paid." McMullan
v. United States, 686 F.2d 915 (Ct. Cl. 1982). See Andrews, supra note 16, at 640 n.300.
Herring and Bowcut should also be contrasted with Estate of Mann v. United States,
552 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D.Tex. 1982), aff'd, 731 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1984). In Estate of Mann,
an estate obtained a refund of income taxes paid by a decedent. The value of this refund
claim had not been included on the estate tax return, and the government sought to recoup
against it the amount of estate tax that would have resulted if the refund had been included.
The court denied recoupment for lack of a single transaction, noting that the government
had approximately three months after the refund claim was filed to assess an estate tax
deficiency. Professor Andrews observes that a tax refund claim should be given its date-of-
death value for estate tax purposes, as to which the amount of tax ultimately recovered is
not necessarily determinative, whereas in Herring and Bowcut, where the estates themselves
paid the income tax deficiencies and deducted them for estate tax purposes, there was an
exact, dollar-for-dollar relationship between such deductions and any income tax refunds
subsequently recovered. He concludes, however, that these considerations are not an "in-
superable barrier" to recoupment. Andrews, supra note 16, at 632 n.238.
'10 301 U.S. 532.
"I Id. at 537.
,09 Compare Hufbauer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Cal. 1968) (allowing
income taxes overpaid by a personal services corporation to be recouped against a deficiency
determined against the sole shareholder where the same items of income were involved)
with Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Kramer was an estate tax
refund action in which the value of a post-death annuity payable to decedent's widow was
held not includible in the decedent's gross estate. The government sought to recoup against
the estate tax refund the widow's income tax deficiency resulting from her treatment,
erroneous in light of the court's decision, of the annuity payments as "income in respect
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3. The Nature of the Claim and Relief under Recoupment
In granting relief in Bull, the Court did not permit the executor
to recover a refund of the barred estate tax, but only "to have
credited against the deficiency of income tax, the amount of his
overpayment of estate tax with interest." 110 Subsequent cases gen-
erally have held that the suit in which recoupment is raised must
relate to the timely tax that is open under the statute of limitations,
rather than the time-barred tax, so that the statute of limitations
is not flagrantly contravened."' This has been described by Pro-
of a decedent," for which a deduction was available under I.R.C. § 691(c) (1988). Because
the widow was not the sole beneficiary of the decedent's estate, the "possibility that the
remaindermen [would] also benefit from the estate tax refund" precluded recoupment. Id.
at 1371; see also Smith v. United States, 373 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1966). See generally
Andrews, supra note 16, at 612 n.85 ("Where different taxpayers are involved in an equitable
recoupment claim by the government, the courts have generally insisted on an absolute
identity of interest between those taxpayers .....
HO Bull, 295 U.S. at 263.
" Thus, for example, in Herring, discussed supra notes 97-101 and accompanying
text, the taxpayer's first suit, seeking a refund of estate taxes clearly barred by the statute
of limitations, was dismissed. The district court held that recoupment could not apply in
that context, but suggested it might be proper in a subsequent action to recover income
taxes. Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536, 538 (E.D.N.C. 1955); see also Schenectady
Trust Co. v. United States, 88-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 13,751 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying
recoupment in a case that involved "Herring-Bowcut" facts, but in which the taxpayer's
suit sought recovery of barred estate tax, rather than subsequently paid income tax). In
Schenectady Trust, the court declined to follow Kolom v. United States, 791 F.2d 762 (9th
Cir. 1986), discussed infra notes 115 and 212, which allowed recoupment to serve as "the
basis of an independent action," finding that that case was "against the weight of authority"
and that it "threaten[ed] to render the provisions of § 6511 a nullity in a large number of
cases." Another notable case is Holzer v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Wis.)
(noting that "[t]he doctrine of equitable recoupment utilizes the fiction of a tax credit or
defense to liability for a year open to suit to avoid violation of the statutory scheme
providing for finality of tax determinations"), aff'd per curiam, 367 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.
1966). See also Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 330 F.2d 635 (Ct. CL. 1964)
(Although the estate had litigated decedent's income tax deficiencies in Tax Court and
entered into settlement paying deficiencies therein and then commenced separate suit in
Court of Claims for barred estate taxes on Herring-Bowcut theory, suit was dismissed as
untimely, after court concluded that statute of limitations was not tolled by subsequent
events at least where the estate could have protected itself by timely refund claim after
Commissioner's deficiency determination.).
However, some decisions have misconstrued the fundamental nature of recoupment
and permitted direct recovery of the barred tax. See Reeves v. United States, 154 F. Supp.
673 (W.D. Pa. 1957) (holding, on facts similar to Herring, that the taxpayer could recover
a refund of overpaid estate tax on the theory that the limitations period on the refund
claim did not begin to run until the government assessed the income tax deficiencies);
Hufbauer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Cal. 1968). In this case, after a personal
services corporation had paid income taxes on income for periods now barred by limitation,
a deficiency was asserted against the sole shareholder with respect to the same items of
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fessor Willis as the "two wrongs make a right" theory of recoup-
ment, on these grounds:
Recoupment, rather than extending the statute of limitations to
correct a perceived injustice, permits a wronged party to recoup
the loss against a sum still open to litigation. This does not
correct the wrong, as does the mitigation statute, but instead
causes a later matter to be equally wrong in the opposite direc-
tion.1 1 2
A number of corollaries follow from this proposition. Foremost
is the thought that the doctrine is "in the nature of a defense
arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the
plaintiff's action is grounded.""' This language has been inter-
preted to mean that a taxpayer that seeks to assert the doctrine
must do so in response to the government's timely asserted defi-
ciency determination. Where there is no such determination, re-
coupment is denied because there is no claim against which it can
operate. To permit a refund suit solely on the basis of recoupment
for recovery of a tax that is on its face time-barred would, in these
circumstances, facially contravene the statute of limitations."
14
income. The shareholder paid the deficiency and together with the corporation brought a
refund suit. The court held that recoupment should be allowed, but, even though only the
shareholder's refund claim was timely, directed the refund be made to only the corporation,
"inasmuch as it was the entity which actually paid the taxes now to be refunded." Id. at
252. These latter cases are criticized in Willis, supra note 28, at 633 n.64, 645-46.
A final illustrative case is Elbert v. Johnson, 164 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1947). There, the
taxpayers had transferred property to a trust, paying gift tax on the transfer. Later, the
Commissioner determined income tax deficiencies on the grounds that the trust lacked
economic substance and that income therefrom should be taxed to the transferor-taxpayers.
As discussed at supra note 71, the taxpayers contested the deficiency in the Tax Court,
which had held that it lacked jurisdiction to grant recoupment of the now-barred gift tax
payment against the sustained income tax deficiency. The taxpayers then brought an income
tax refund suit in the district court, contending that they should be entitled to recoup the
barred gift tax payment. The court held that this subsequent suit was barred by I.R.C. §
6512(b) (1988), because the income tax sought had been the subject of a timely Tax Court
petition. In a concurring opinion, Judge Learned Hand suggested that the suit might be
construed not as a suit for refund of income tax, but rather for refund of gift tax paid in
1938. He read Bull as permitting such a suit, suggesting that in effect, the statute of
limitations on recovery of the gift tax would be tolled if the taxpayer had acted in good
faith. Even on this theory, however, he would have denied relief in this case because the
taxpayers had essentially engaged in a sham transaction and had not acted in good faith.
See Elbert, 164 F.2d at 424-25 (L. Hand, J., concurring).
112 Willis, supra note 20, at 633.
"I Electric Storage Battery, 329 U.S. at 299 (quoting Bull, 295 U.S. at 262).
1,4 Thus, in Brigham v. United States, 470 F.2d 571 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 831 (1973), the Commissioner determined, and the taxpayers paid income tax deficien-
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Analogous results have followed in situations where a deficiency
was asserted, but litigated or settled separately, and thereafter, a
taxpayer brought an independent action based upon equitable re-
coupment. 115 In such cases, taxpayers are again in the predicament
of expressly seeking recovery of a tax barred by the statute of
limitations, where recoupment has generally been denied. Courts,
however, usually have not rested the denial on this specific ground,1 16
often finding instead that the taxes involved did not arise out of
the same transaction or were not inconsistent. 117
cies for 1958 through 1961 on the theory that gain on the installment sale of stock in 1958
to a charitable organization was ordinary income. Later, the Commissioner proposed similar
1962 deficiencies for several of the taxpayers, but then, in light of Commissioner v. Brown,
380 U.S. 563 (1965), which sanctioned capital gain treatment in such transactions, indicated
that such deficiencies would not be asserted. The taxpayers then sought refunds of their
barred overpayments for 1958 through 1961, relying in part upon equitable recoupment.
The Court denied recovery on this theory for a variety of reasons. In addition to suggesting
that the mitigation provisions preempted recoupment in this situation and that a single
transaction was lacking, the Court also said:
Mhe plaintiffs ... misapprehend the historical function of the recoupment
remedy in the tax law. When its benefits are sought by the taxpayer, the
function of the doctrine is to allow the taxpayer to reduce the amount of a
deficiency recoverable by the Government by the amount of an otherwise
barred overpayment of the taxpayer .... Here, no such situation exists. The
taxpayers here are not seeking to reduce deficiencies in later years. The
Government concedes that no such deficiencies exist. Rather, the plaintiffs are
attempting an extension of the doctrine of equitable recoupment to the case
of a refund of taxes for an otherwise barred year.
Brigham, 470 F.2d at 577 (emphasis in original); see also Estate of Mitchell v. United
States, 645 F. Supp. 274 (S.D. Fla. 1986). In Estate of Mitchell, the taxpayers paid
deficiencies for 1972 through 1976 resulting from the disallowance of partnership losses.
Other partners contested similar deficiencies in the Tax Court, where a settlement allowed
most of the losses. The taxpayers then brought a separate refund suit relying upon, inter
alia, equitable recoupment. The court granted summary judgment against them, finding
that they were "attempting to use recoupment not in its traditional form as a defense, but
as an independent ground for overcoming the effect of the statute of limitations." Id. at
277.
Further, in Ellard v. United States, 81-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 16,370 (Ct. Cl.
1981), in which the taxpayer brought suit alleging overpayments of excise taxes for years
barred by the statute of limitations, recoupment was denied on the grounds that "[t]he
plaintiff is not attempting to offset a barred claim against a claim of the Government.
Instead, it is using equitable recoupment to revive its own untimely affirmative claim." Id.
at 88,864.
"I See infra note 117. But see Kolom, 791 F.2d 762 (permitting suit for recovery of
time-barred 1973 minimum tax after government's deficiency determination for 1972 mini-
mum tax, against which the taxpayer's recoupment claim related, was litigated in the Tax
Court). For a discussion of Kolom, see infra note 212.
"6 But see O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1985); Epperson v. United
States, 473 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (suggesting recoupment should have been raised,
if at all, in earlier actions). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 117, 212.
" Cf. Kellogg-Citizens, 330 F.2d 635 (though not expressly discussing recoupment).
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Finally, because equitable recoupment is in the nature of a
defense, the doctrine does not lift the bar of the statute of limi-
In many of these cases, the government timely asserted an estate tax deficiency that was
first litigated in the Tax Court, and the claimant thereafter brought a separate income tax
refund suit for years barred by the statute of limitations on the theory that the result in
the Tax Court case would, in hindsight, entitle the claimant to more favorable income tax
treatment. In Evans Trust v. United States, 462 F.2d 521 (Ct. CI. 1972), after a Tax Court
settlement found no estate tax deficiency, but included in a decedent's gross estate the value
of certain installment notes, a trust which held the notes brought an income tax refund suit
for barred years asserting that in light of this inclusion, income from the notes was income
in respect of a decedent, entitling the plaintiff to a deduction under I.R.C. § 691(c) (1988).
The court denied relief based on recoupment, noting that the doctrine can only serve as a
defense to an asserted claim:
In the present case, the plaintiff's claims for refund were not timely. Further-
more, since the Government's asserted deficiency was settled by a determina-
tion that no deficiency existed, plaintiff is attempting to use recoupment not
in its traditional form as a defense to an asserted deficiency, but as an
independent ground for reopening years now closed by the statute of limita-
tions.
Id. at 526.
In Gindes v. United States, 661 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1981), affd 740 F.2d 947 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1074 (1984), after a Tax Court estate tax deficiency case
determined that certain partnership interests were includible in a decedent's gross estate,
holders of the interests brought income tax refund suits for then-barred years on the theory
that they should be entitled to an increased basis in such interests, which in turn would
have increased their shares of the partnership's depreciation deductions had the partnerships
made an election under I.R.C. § 754 (1988) to increase the basis of depreciable partnership
property. The court denied recoupment, holding that there was no single taxable event and
that because § 754 is elective, it was not inconsistent to include the partnership interests in
the gross estate without automatically giving a stepped-up basis for partnership assets.
In O'Brien, 766 F.2d 1038, also discussed infra note 212, after an estate tax deficiency
was litigated in the Tax Court, which held certain property includible in a decedent's gross
estate at a higher value than originally reported, the court refused to permit an individual
taxpayer to bring a separate income tax refund suit for barred years based on recoupment,
theorizing that he could use a higher basis in such property that he disposed of in those
years.
Provident Nat'l Bank v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Pa. 1981), further
illustrates. After a Tax Court settlement held certain corporate stock includible in the
decedent's gross estate, trusts that sold the stock in a then-barred year brought an income
tax refund suit claiming the benefits of a stepped-up, date-of-death fair market value basis.
The court denied recoupment on the grounds that there was nothing against which the
taxpayer-trusts could offset the overpayment of its income taxes, and further, that the estate
and the trusts were two separate taxpayers; equitable recoupment cannot be used to "revive
a time-barred claim of one taxpayer because of the government's treatment of a related but
separate taxpayer." Id. at 1204.
In each of the above cases, an estate tax deficiency was litigated in the Tax Court and
recoupment was relied on, unsuccessfully, as the basis of a subsequent income tax refund
suit. For a case arising in another context, but similarly suggesting that recoupment cannot
be raised in a separate untimely action after litigation of the related tax consequences in
another proceeding, see Epperson v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Wis. 1979). In
Epperson, a personal services corporation sued for refund of income taxes paid in years
[VOL. 80
1990-91] EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT REVISITED
tations to permit an affirmative recovery of the full amount of the
barred claim; rather, it can be used only to "reduce or wipe out
the open claim, but no more" and "merely operates as a 'dimi-
nution of ... [the] right to recover' on the open claim." 118 "Oth-
erwise, it would, in effect, permit the party asserting the barred
claim full collection or recovery thereon, thereby completely un-
dercutting the statute of limitations." 19
4. Issues of Diligence and Timing
Finally, two timing questions must be considered. The first is
whether recoupment is subject to a defense such as laches. If so,
recoupment would be denied where the party asserting it could
have taken, but did not take, measures to protect against the
running of the statute of limitations with respect to the matter on
which the recoupment claim is based.120 Some arguable lack of
barred by the statute of limitations after a court had held in a separate refund suit by the
shareholder that income reported by the corporation was taxable to the shareholder. In the
later suit by the corporation, the court denied recoupment, stating: "It is fundamental...
that the main action in which equitable recoupment is sought must be timely .... Plaintiff's
claim should have been raised, if at all, in the earlier action." Id. at 1362. Cf. Ellard, 81-
2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 16,370. Ellard suggested that the taxpayer may have been seeking
to recoup his barred excise tax overpayments against excise tax deficiencies of a partnership
of which he was a partner and which were the subject of a separate Court of Claims suit.
The court said, "[I]f so, then his claim founders" upon the single transaction requirement:
The plaintiff seeks a refund of excise taxes he paid upon the sales to the
partnership. The partnership's claim, however, relates to excise taxes upon the
partnership's sales of fuel oil for use in highway vehicles. These were two
different taxable events and their respective tax liabilities cannot be equitably
recouped against each other.
Id. at 88,864.
"' See Andrews, supra note 16, at 625 n.184 (quoting Stone, 301 U.S. at 539). But
cf. Zeeman v. United States, 395 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g 275 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). In Zeeman, the district court had held that taxpayer could use recoupment to "reduce
any additional amount owed to the government ... up to the amount of the erroneously
paid taxes for 1962." Zeeman, 275 F. Supp. at 261. The court of appeals remanded on this
issue because it found that the statute of limitations for filing a refund claim for 1962
remained open and thus did "not agree that the theory of equitable recoupment, established
in Bull v. United States mark[ed] the limit of the taxpayer's recovery." Zeeman, 395 F.2d
at 868 (citation omitted). See also Dysart v. United States, 340 F.2d 624, 626 (Ct. CL. 1965)
(observing that where a refund of approximately $4,500 was sought, the government's set-
off claim, of some $130,000, "[was] cognizable only to the extent of reducing the taxpayers'
claim to zero").
"' Andrews, supra note 16, at 625. Compare the mitigation provisions, which generally
do lift the bar of the statute of limitations in order to correct the effect of the error itself,
so that an adjustment is not limited to the amount of the timely asserted claim. See
Andrews, supra note 16, at 620 n.148; Willis, supra note 20, at 633.
' Cf. Wilmington Trust, 610 F.2d at 714 (stating, "Equitable recoupment is an equity
doctrine, and fairness to the parties is an important consideration in the application of
equitable principles").
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diligence will not preclude recoupment where all the other prere-
quisites for applying the doctrine, such as the single transaction
requirement, are satisfied. 2 1 Several decisions appear to suggest
otherwise, but in each, recoupment was denied because some es-
sential element of the doctrine was lacking; those cases thus denied
recoupment on other grounds, justifying the result by observing
that protective action could have been taken before the statute had
run.122 Thus, the fact that corrective action was available but not
2I Several cases have allowed recoupment even though the party asserting the doctrine
could have taken protective action within the applicable limitations period. Generally, such
protective action would consist of the filing of a refund claim by the taxpayer, or the
assertion of a deficiency by the government. The Ninth Circuit, in Boivcut, observed that
in Bull itself, under the statutes then in effect, the executor had up to one month in which
to file a timely estate tax refund claim when the Commissioner first asserted the income
tax deficiency, but "equitable relief was not denied for this reason." Bowcut, 287 F.2d at
657; see Andrews, supra note 16, at 601 n.27; cf. Holzer, 250 F. Supp. at 878 (stating that
"laches is not a defense to a claim for equitable recoupment," but holding the doctrine
unavailable in an income tax refund suit brought after the income tax deficiencies had been
litigated in the Tax Court); Dysart v. United States, 340 F.2d 624 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (rejecting
the argument that the government shbuld be precluded from- using the doctrine of setoff
where it could have determined the correct tax before the statute of limitations had run);
Yagoda v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 485 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964) (holding
that the Commissioner could use the mitigation provisions to collect otherwise barred
deficiencies even though he could have timely asserted a deficiency upon learning of the
filing of a refund claim by taxpayer).
122 Estate of Mann, 552 F. Supp. at 1135 (In denying the government's recoupment
claim on the merits for lack of a single transaction, the court noted that the statute for
assessment of an estate tax deficiency expired some three months after the plaintiff's claim
for refund was filed, but did not place any emphasis on this fact.). In Wells Fargo Bank
& Union Trust Co. v. United States, 245 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1957), the court allowed a
refund of income tax to the estate of a deceased husband, on the grounds that income from
community property after death was taxable entirely to his wife (also now deceased), instead
of one-half to her and one-half to his estate. The government sought to recoup an income
tax deficiency owing from the wife, since she had not been taxed on all the income from
the property. The court denied such relief because an adequate remedy was available under
the mitigation provisions. It noted, however, that the Commissioner had approximately 18
months after the decision in Bishop v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1945), which
held such income taxable to a decedent's wife in similar circumstances, in which to pursue
the deficiency owing from the wife's estate, but had "failed to take any steps to collect the
tax except by way of an attempted recoupment." Wells Fargo, 245 F.2d at 535. See also
Provident Nat'l, 507 F. Supp. at 1204. There, the court denied recoupment stating, "[I]t
cannot be used to revive the time barred claim of one taxpayer because of the government's
treatment of a related but separate taxpayer" and noted, but did not rely on, the govern-
ment's argument that the taxpayer was aware that the basis of assets might be affected by
an asserted estate tax deficiency and had over a year in which to file a protective income
tax refund claim after it became aware of the proposed estate tax deficiency. See also
Journal Co. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 434, 439-40 (E.D. Wis. 1961) (finding recoupment
preempted on the facts by the mitigation provisions, but noting that the statute of limitations
was open for about one year after the taxpayer gave notice of its inconsistent position;
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taken prior to the statute's expiration is not a bar to recoupment.
The second timing question, which is related, asks whether such a
state of affairs is actually an affirmative precondition to recoup-
ment. In other words, must the now-barred claim have been ca-
pable of being timely asserted when the other party first took steps
to allege the timely claim to which recoupment is raised as a
defense? Bull could be read as imposing such a requirement, since
the Court there indicated:
To the objection that the sovereign is not liable to respond to the
petitioner, the answer is that it has given him a right of credit or
refund, which, though he could not assert it in an action brought
by him in 1930, had accrued and was available to him since it
was actionable and not barred in 1925 when the Government
proceeded against him for the collection of income tax.123
In Electric Storage Battery, the Court noted that Bull had
"emphasized that the refund of the incorrect tax was not barred
by the statute at the time the Government proceeded for collection
of the correct tax."1 24 At least one district court decision interprets
this language as imposing such a "timeliness" requirement, under
which the recoupment claim, to be effective, must have been ame-
nable to timely assertion at the time that the main claim itself was
asserted. 2
However, the sounder view would permit recoupment even
though the recoupment claim was already time-barred when the
main claim first was asserted. Although a contrary rule might
appear justified to ensure that the subject matter of the recoupment
Wood v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 764, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd in part, 213 F.2d
660 (2d Cir. 1954) (denying recoupment for lack of single transaction, but noting that
although the taxpayer's main claim (relating to 1944) was sustained in Commissioner v.
Korrell, 10 T.C. 1001 (1948), "nothing appears to have been done" by the Commissioner
to keep open the statute of limitations on assessment for 1945, to which the government's
recoupment claim related).
The better view suggests that recoupment should be permitted even where such correc-
tive action could have been taken within the applicable limitations period. The primary
purpose of the doctrine is to alleviate inequities and it is at odds with that purpose to
preclude its use by parties that in perfect hindsight could theoretically have protected
themselves, but may in fact not have understood the precise implications of a particular
event. Moreover, this approach obviates the need to determine what events should alert a
party to take protective action and what period of delay should be considered acceptable.
"I Bull, 295 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added).
12 Electric Storage Battery, 329 U.S. at 300 n.2.
1'2 Minskoff v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other
grounds, 490 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
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claim is not so remote that evidence concerning it would be exces-
sively stale,' that function is already adequately served by the
"single transaction" requirement reaffirmed in Electric Storage
Battery.'27 This is not to say that evidence concerning a recoupment
claim will never be stale in an absolute sense; however, since the
recoupment claim must relate to the same transaction as the timely,
main claim, evidence concerning it will generally be no more stale
than the evidence concerning the main claim. More importantly,
such a requirement would preclude relief where the statute of
limitations works its harshest result: cases in which the main claim
is asserted after the recoupment-based claim is already barred by
the statute of limitations. For example, it would preclude a tax-
payer from asserting recoupment, where claim for a refund of the
tax sought to be recouped was already barred at the time of the
government's deficiency determination. In this situation, the Fourth
Circuit has noted:
In one respect, the equities in favor of the taxpayer are stronger
here than in the Bull case, for in the latter the time for filing a
claim for refund of the estate tax had not expired when the
income tax was assessed, whereas in the pending case the income
tax was not assessed until after the refund of the estate tax was
barred.12
12 The mitigation provisions impose an analogous "timeliness" requirement as to
determinations that result in erroneous double exclusions of items of income and erroneous
double disallowances of deductions. See I.R.C. § 1311(b)(2) (1988). In these circumstances,
the mitigation provisions will afford relief only if, as of a time therein specified, the party
seeking relief was not barred from correcting the error by timely assessing a deficiency or
timely filing a refund claim, as the case may be. This requirement is intended to "prevent
either the taxpayer or the government from arbitrarily reopening a closed year simply by
taking an untenable position in any later year, no matter how far removed." Note, Sections
1311-15 of the Internal Revenue Code: Some Problems in Administration, 72 HAv. L.
REv. 1536, 1541 (1959).
,2, The Court, in Electric Storage Battery, did not specify whether such a timeliness
requirement should be imposed, but if it thought one should, it might have been because
it believed such a requirement would help ensure against extreme remoteness between the
two claims. Indeed, in denying the claim before it for lack of a single transaction, it was
certainly concerned with such problems, noting that the taxes sought to be recouped there
were "collected over twenty years before" the suit was brought, "and for over sixteen years
barred by the statute [of limitations]." Electric Storage Battery, 329 U.S. at 302.
,21 Herring, 240 F.2d at 228. In Herring, although the income tax deficiency was not
assessed until the time for filing an estate tax refund claim had lapsed, the Commissioner
first issued a preliminary notice proposing an income tax deficiency when there still remained
about one year in which to file a timely estate tax refund claim. Nevertheless, the court
seemed to look at the date of "assessment" as critical. This approach seems reasonable,
since it would be overly burdensome to require a party to take corrective action until it
appears fairly certain that the other party will actually assert or act upon its claim.
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In light of the cases, which permit recoupment even where the
party asserting it arguably lacked diligence, a timeliness require-
ment would have the curious effect of allowing recoupment to
those that could have protected themselves but failed to do so,
while denying it to those that could not have protected themselves
at all. If recoupment were available to only one of these two
groups of taxpayers, it would seem that it should be open to the
latter. Finally, adopting such a "timeliness" requirement would
require courts to determine what "triggering events" were accept-
able. 129 Rejection of such a requirement eliminates such difficulties.
Appropriately, courts generally have declined to read the above-
described language of Bull as imposing such a requirement.'30
Having thus traced the development of recoupment in the early
decisions of the Supreme Court and outlined its principal modern
day features, it is appropriate now to examine the Supreme Court's
revisiting of the doctrine in United States v. Dalm.
III. THE SUPREME COURT REVISITS EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT:
United States v. Dalm
A. Facts and Background
In May, 1975, Francis Dalm (Dalm), a long time employee of
Harold Schrier (Harold), was appointed administratrix of Harold's
estate at the request of Clarence Schrier (Clarence), Harold's brother
and sole beneficiary.' In 1976 and 1977, the estate paid Dalm, as
administratrix, fees of $30,000 and $7,000, respectively. In addi-
tion, Clarence transferred to Dalm $180,000 in 1976 and $133,813
in 1977, apparently from the proceeds of the estate. 32 Clarence
9 See supra notes 122, 128.
11 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, supra note 128 and accompanying text; see also
Hufbauer, 297 F. Supp. 247. In Hufbauer, the government timely asserted income tax
deficiencies against an individual for items of income that had been included erroneously
on returns of his wholly-owned personal services corporation. The corporation and the
shareholder instituted actions for refund as soon as practicable after the deficiency deter-
mination and payment were made, but the statute of limitations had already run against
the corporation. Finding that they had together paid taxes of approximately $90,000 on
income of $65,000, and opining "that a mere technical statute of limitations bar is the only
apparent obstruction to a refund," the court concluded, "Nothing inherent in these circum-
stances would bar assertion of the theory of equitable recoupment." Id. at 251.
.. United States v. DaIm, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 1361, 1363 (1990).
132 As noted, Dalm had been Harold's employee for many years and Clarence pur-
portedly paid her these amounts to effectuate his brother's intention that she share in part
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and his wife filed a gift tax return for 1976, reporting the $180,000
transfer in that year as a gift for federal gift tax purposes, and
thus incurring liability of $18,675 for gift tax and $1,587 for
interest and penalties, all of which was ultimately "paid" by Dalm. 33
No gift tax return was filed nor was any gift tax paid on the
amounts transferred in 1977.
On June 21, 1983, the Commissioner issued to Dalm and her
husband a notice of income tax deficiencies and penalties due of
$96,045 for 1976 and $74,171 for 1977.134 The deficiencies were
based upon the Commissioner's determination that the amounts
received from Clarence in those years represented taxable income
as additional compensation for services as administratrix. 135 Dalm
challenged this determination in the United States Tax Court,
maintaining that the transfers were a gift from Clarence to effec-
tuate Harold's intention that she share in his estate. 136 After two
days of trial, Dalm and the Commissioner settled, and the Tax
Court entered a stipulated decision on December 4, 1984, finding
income tax deficiencies of $10,416 for 1976 and $70,639 for 1977.137
Dalm paid these deficiencies and filed a refund claim for
$20,262, the amount of gift tax and penalties previously paid with
respect to the 1976 transfer. When it was denied, she instituted a
district court refund suit contending that because the Tax Court
settlement treated the 1976 and 1977 transfers as compensation
includible in her gross income, the transfers could not also be
"gifts" for federal gift tax purposes. 138 The United States argued
of his estate. See Dalm v. United States, 867 F.2d 305, 306-07 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd, -
U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990). In the aggregate, such transfers constituted approxi-
mately one-third of the net estate. Id. at 306.
M' Dalm, 867 F.2d at 306. The district court noted that the Schriers paid these amounts
in December, 1976 and February, 1977 and then Dalm reimbursed them shortly afterwards.
See United States v. Dalm, 89-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 13,806, at 88,160 (S.D. Mich.),
rev'd, 867 F.2d 305 (1989), rev'd, - U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990).
11 Dalm, 867 F.2d at 306.
"I When the income tax deficiency notice was mailed, any possible claim for refund
of the 1976 gift taxes was barred by the statute of limitations. See infra note 139. It may
seem surprising that the Commissioner's notice of deficiency for 1976 and 1977 income
taxes could itself have been timely, not having been issued until June 21, 1983. None of
the Dalm opinions discussed this point. The Commissioner may have relied upon the six-
year statute of limitations under I.R.C. § 6501(e) (1988), or the parties may have otherwise
extended the statute of limitations on assessment and collection by agreement pursuant to
I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4).
136 See supra note 132.
, Dalm, 867 F.2d at 307.
W3' hile not entirely clear from the appellate court's opinion, the district court
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that I.R.C. § 6511(a) barred refund of the 1976 gift taxes. 139 The
district court phrased the key issue as whether Dalm could recover
under equitable recoupment despite the bar of the statute of limi-
tations. In holding that she could not, the court emphasized that
the doctrine "is not without its limitations,"'' 40 and is in the "nature
of a defense" that could not be maintained in an "independent
lawsuit." '' 4' It further held that recoupment was inappropriate be-
cause the 1976 gift tax paid appeared to have been considered in
the Tax Court settlement,' 42 noting that Dalm was attempting to
"relitigate the tax liability imposed upon the 1976 transfer ... by
the Tax Court settlement" contrary to I.R.C. § 6512(a). 143
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, stating:
Three criteria must be satisfied for application of equitable re-
coupment in a tax case. There must be (1) a single transaction or
taxable event, (2) that event must be subjected to two taxes based
on inconsistent legal theories, and (3) the amount claimed in
recoupment must be barred by limitations while the government's
deficiency claim must be timely.144
The court found these conditions satisfied, holding that Dalm's
receipt of approximately $180,000 in 1976 had been subjected to
indicated that suit was for "refund of $20,262.19 in gift taxes, interest and penalties paid
to the Internal Revenue Service with respect to a transfer to her of $180,000 in September
1976 by Clarence and Ethel Schrier." Dalm, 89-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) at 88,160.
139 I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1988) provides that claim for refund of any tax that requires the
filing of a return must be made within three years from the time the return is filed or two
years from the time the tax is paid, whichever period expires later.
,,0 Dalm, 89-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) at 88,161 (citing Rothensies v. Electric Storage
Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1947)).
'4 Id. (citing O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1985)).
141 The district court stated:
Factually, the liability ... was apportioned first to the taxable year 1977 in
which no gift tax was reported or paid. In fact, tHe majority of the liability
was so applied .... This is interesting when the largest transfer occurred in
1976 not 1977. One cannot escape the conclusion that the smaller liability
allocated for the year 1976 ... was reflective of the tax already paid on that
transfer, albeit a gift tax. No other explanation seems plausible.
Id.
,13 I.R.C. § 6512(a) (1988), generally precludes subsequent suits to recover any part of
a tax that was the subject of a timely filed Tax Court petition. See infra text accompanying
note 257.
" Dalm, 867 F.2d at 310 (citing Kolom v. United States, 791 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir.
1986)).
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income tax and gift tax on inconsistent legal theories 45 and that
the refund claim was in the "nature of a defense" to the govern-
ment's timely asserted deficiency. It thus concluded that the refund
action was not time-barred, "though filed more than three years
after the gift taxes were paid". 146 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a perceived conflict in the circuits and re-
versed. 147
B. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority,' 48 Justice Kennedy resolved in the
negative what he considered the "ultimate question in the case,"
namely "whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Dalm's
suit seeking a refund of the gift tax, interest, and penalties paid
on the 1976 transfer."'' 49
Justice Kennedy first examined the statutes governing district
court jurisdiction in federal tax matters, beginning with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(1).150 He cautioned that, despite its "spacious terms,"
this statute must be read in light of I.R.C. §§ 7422 and 6511(a),
which make the timely filing of a refund claim a prerequisite to
,41 The Court found the case analogous to Bull v. United States and stated:
Mrs. Dalm had no final determination upon which to seek a refund of gift
tax ... until the [Tax Court's] stipulated decision settled the question by
determining that the 1976 transfer of $180,000 was taxable income. Only at
this point was the single transaction subjected to two taxes on inconsistent
legal theories.
Id.
146 Id. Technically speaking, the three-year limitations period under § 6511(a) is meas-
ured from the filing of the return, rather than the payment of the tax. The court of appeals
agreed that recoupment would only be proper if the Tax Court settlement had not taken
the 1976 gift taxes into account, but found summary judgment on that issue inappropriate
and would have given Dalm the opportunity to make such a factual showing. Id. at 312.
,41 Dalm, __ U.S. at 1 10 S. Ct. at 1364; see also infra note 212.
141 Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Black-
mun, O'Connor and Scalia.
,49 Dalm, - U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1364.
'- Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1988) provides as follows:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States
Claims Court, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue
tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in
any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.
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maintaining a refund suit.15 ' Taking these provisions together, he
concluded that unless a refund claim is timely filed, a refund suit
cannot be maintained in any court, even if the tax "is alleged to
have been 'erroneously,' 'illegally,' or 'wrongfully collected." '
152
Since Dalm's gift tax refund claim was filed "long after the limi-
tations period had expired," she had failed to comply with these
requirements. Thus, "Under the plain language of § 6511(a) and
§ 7422(a), the District Court was barred from entertaining her suit
for a refund of the tax.' '5 3
Justice Kennedy distinguished Bull v. United States154 in ex-
plaining why the doctrine of equitable recoupment did not support
Dalm's suit. He emphasized that in Bull, the claim for recoupment
of estate tax was litigated as part of a timely suit for refund of
income tax arising from the same transaction, over which the Court
of Claims' jurisdiction was undisputed. By contrast, Dalm was not
seeking to invoke equitable recoupment regarding the barred gift
tax in determining her income tax liability; she had already litigated
her income tax liability in the Tax Court without raising equitable
recoupment and was foreclosed from relitigating it by I.R.C. §
6512(a).' 55 Rather, she invoked the doctrine "only in a separate
action for refund of gift tax, an action for which there is no
statutory authorization by reason of the bar of the limitations
I' I.R.C. § 7422 (1988) requires, as a condition to bringing a refund suit, that a claim
for refund or credit be "duly filed ... , according to the provisions of law in that regard,
and the regulations ... established in pursuance thereof." I.R.C. § 6511(a) provides that
if a tax requires the filing of a return, any claim for refund of such tax must be filed within
three years from the time the return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid,
whichever period expires later. See also Dalm, - U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1364-65.
,52 Dalm, - U.S. at -_, 110 S. Ct. at 1365. Justice Kennedy apparently was
responding to the distinction, perceived by Justice Stevens, within 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)
between suits for taxes alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected
and suits to recover sums that were "wrongfully" collected. See infra text accompanying
notes 196-202.
1,3 Dalm, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1365.
25 295 U.S 247 (1935).
" Dalm, - U.S. at __ 110 S. Ct. at 1367. Subject to certain exceptions not
applicable here, I.R.C. § 6512(a) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Effect of Petition to Tax Court.-If the Secretary has mailed to the
taxpayer a notice of deficiency under section 6212(a) (relating to deficiencies
of income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes) and if the taxpayer files a
petition with the Tax Court within the time prescribed by section 6213(a), no
credit or refund of income tax for the same taxable year ... to which such
petition relates, in respect of which the Secretary has determined the deficiency
shall be allowed or made and no suit by the taxpayer for the recovery of any
part of the tax shall be instituted in any court....
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statute. 156 To Dalm's contention that this was a "meaningless
procedural distinction," Justice Kennedy responded, "A distinction
that has jurisdiction as its central concept is not meaningless.'y 5 7
Recognizing Stone v. White'5 8 as the Court's only other case
upholding a claim based upon equitable recoupment, Justice Ken-
nedy found that, there too, the court in which recoupment was
raised had jurisdiction over the underlying action-"the trust's
timely action for refund of income tax.' 1 59 He reasoned that Bull
and Stone held only that a party litigating a claim in a timely
proceeding may, in that proceeding, seek recoupment of a related,
and inconsistent, but now time-barred claim relating to the same
transaction.' 60 In both Bull and Stone, "The courts in which the
refund actions were brought had jurisdiction," and neither case
had "allowed equitable recoupment to be the sole basis for juris-
diction."1 61
Justice Kennedy invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and the respective roles of statutes of limitations and equitable
recoupment in light of it. He emphasized: (1) The United States is
immune from suit without its consent, and "the terms of its consent
to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction";' 62 (2) A
statute limiting the time for claims against the Government is one
of the terms of Congress's waiver of sovereign immunity; and, (3)
While such a limitations provision should not be read "unduly
116 Dalm,__ U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1367. Justice Kennedy noted that for the
cases to be identical in all material respects, the procedural posture of Bull would have to
have been significantly different. Specifically, it would require "the executor in Bull ...
[to] have litigated the income tax liability, without raising a claim of equitable recoupment
in the Board of Tax Appeals and/or in the Court of Claims, with the Government winning
in each forum." Id. Then, after paying the income tax liability, he would have to have
filed a separate suit for refund of the time-barred estate tax liability. On this point, Justice
Kennedy commented:
Had the case come to us with those facts, we would have faced the issue
presented here: whether the court in which the taxpayer was seeking a refund
was barred from entertaining the suit. We can say with assurance that we
were not presented with this issue in Bull, and did not consider it. Even had
the issue been raised, Bull itself suggests that we would have rejected Dalm's
argument out-of-hand.
Dalm, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1367-68.
"I Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1367.
I's 301 U.S. 532 (1937).
Dalm, - U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1368.
, Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1368.
161 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1368.
I d., 110 S. Ct. at 1368 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)
(quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941))).
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restrictively," it should also not be interpreted "in a manner that
would 'extend the waiver beyond that which Congress in-
tended." ' 1 63 Declaring that Bull and Stone had not "suspended
rules of jurisdiction and so [had] not deviated from these princi-
ples" and that "the power to consent to such suits is reserved to
Congress," Justice Kennedy declined Dalm's invitation "to go
beyond the authority Congress has given us in permitting suits
against the Government."' 14 Noting that the facts were not within
the mitigation provisions, which he termed a legislative "set of
exceptions to the limitations period," Justice Kennedy concluded
that allowing Dalm's suit on the basis of equitable recoupment
"would be doing little more than overriding Congress's judgment
as to when equity requires that there be an exception to the
limitations bar.' 165 He added, however, that the Court's holding
did not preclude taxpayers from invoking the doctrine, either at
the administrative level or before a court having jurisdiction over
a timely suit for refund. 166
Finally, rejecting the Sixth Circuit's holding that recoupment
was available because a single transaction had been subjected to
two taxes on inconsistent theories, Justice Kennedy observed, "[T]o
permit an independent action for recoupment because there is but
one transaction is to mistake the threshold requirement for its
rationale.' 6 7 He again emphasized that the doctrine must be raised
in a timely action, stating:
It is true that our precedents allowing recoupment pertain to cases
where a single transaction is subjected to inconsistent taxation,
but the reason the statute of limitations is not a bar in those
cases is that the court has uncontested jurisdiction to adjudicate
one of the taxes in question. In such cases, a court has the
M63 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1368 (quoting Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983)
(quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-118 (1979))).
114 Dalm, - U.S. at __ , 110 S. Ct. at 1368-69.
6s Id. at -_, 110 S. Ct. at 1369. Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice Kennedy's
reliance upon the mitigation provisions for this purpose. See U.S. at -_, 110 S.
Ct. at 1376 n.10 Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra note 206 and text accompanying notes
218-28, 233.
6 Dalm, - U.S. at __, 110 S. Ct. at 1369.
"' Id. at -_, 110 S. Ct. at 1369. Justice Kennedy thus suggested that although the
rationale for equitable recoupment is that a single transaction has been taxed twice on two
inconsistent theories, this fact alone does not permit its application. Rather, as a threshold
matter, the claim for recoupment must be asserted in a timely suit over which the court
has jurisdiction.
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equitable power to examine and consider the entire transac-
tion .... 168
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the government had as-
serted an income tax deficiency on a theory that was inconsistent
with the one relied upon by Dalm in paying the gift tax. But he
emphasized that she "chose to litigate the deficiency in the Tax
Court, where she did not attempt to raise a recoupment claim,"' 69
observing in a footnote that the case presented "no occasion to
pass upon the question whether Dalm could have raised a recoup-
ment claim in the Tax Court.' 7 0 Having so chosen, she could not,
under the "controlling jurisdictional statutes," now "seek to re-
open the matter and override the statute of limitations for the sole
purpose of seeking recoupment."17 1
C. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented. Unpersuaded by the majority's distinctions, Stevens would
have allowed Dalm's suit under "the just rule of the Bull case.' 72
Suggesting preliminarily that the decision "cast a shadow" on
the executive branch and the Court, but "otherwise has no appar-
ent importance," Justice Stevens predicted that it would be neither
celebrated nor often cited. 73 He found that the majority's opinion
had "reserve[d] in a footnote an issue that would render obsolete
its holding,"' 74 and was "remarkable not at all for what it says
but rather for what it leaves unsaid.' ' 75 He criticized the majority's
"parsing of sovereign immunity and jurisdiction[,]" which
"mask[ed] ... the ultimate question" in the case. 7 6 To Justice
Stevens, this question was "whether a statute of limitations oth-
erwise barring a refund of federal income tax is tolled by govern-
ment conduct that this Court has censured as 'immoral' and
,61 Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1369-70 (citing Electric Storage Battery, 329 U.S. at
299).
'6 Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1370.
1,0 Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1370 n.8.
'7 Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1370.
172 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1370 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
,73 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1370.
'7 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1370. This "reserved issue" is whether Dalm could properly have
raised an equitable recoupment claim before the Tax Court. See infra note 241.
177 Dalm, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1370.
16 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1370.
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tantamount to 'a fraud on the taxpayer's rights." 1 77 Noting that
Bull had so characterized the government's retention of estate tax
while collecting an income tax on the same transaction, 78 he found
that Dalm involved an "equally unjust retention of a previously
paid tax' '1 79 since the Government had "collected an income tax
on a transfer of $180,000 to respondent while retaining the gift tax
previously paid on the same transfer."''
Justice Stevens addressed the majority's conclusion that Dalm
"chose to litigate in Tax Court ... and, having made this choice,
cannot 'then seek to reopen the matter and override the statute of
limitations for the sole purpose of seeking recoupment."" '1 81 He
sought to clarify why the government had not relied on principles
of claim preclusion in this case and why the majority had to "recite
so much law to decide it."1182 Specifically, he cited two "facts" to
"explain" what the majority had not. 183 First, the parties them-
selves had agreed "that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction" to
consider the recoupment claim.'8 4 Second, Dalm clearly could have
used recoupment to recover the 1976 gift tax in a refund action
after receiving the notice of income tax deficiency in 1983, "even
though the statute of limitations had long since run."'' 85 But while
a "more affluent" but "not a less fortunate" taxpayer might have
been able to pay the deficiency and file such a refund suit,8 6
" Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1370 (citing Bull, 295 U.S. at 261).
Id. at __ , 110 S. Ct. at 1370-71 (citing Bull, 295 U.S. at 261).
Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1371.
"8 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1371. Justice Stevens asserted that the Government's position
here was arguably more outrageous than in Bull, where the income tax assessment was
"perfectly sound." Here, the income tax determination was based "on the remarkable
theory that payments aggregating $313,813 constituted compensation for ... services as
administratrix... when the probate court had approved a total of $37,000 as compensation
for those services." However, he placed no reliance on this aspect of the case, just as the
majority "correctly abstain[ed] from suggesting that the harshness of its holding is mitigated
by the unresolved factual dispute about whether the Tax Court settlement took into account
the prior gift tax payment." Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1371 n.1.
"' Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1371 (citation omitted).
"' Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1371. Justice Stevens believed that there was no relevant conflict
in the circuits, and that even if there were, it would not be important enough to merit the
Court's attention. Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2; see infra note 212.
Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1371-72.
,8 Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1372. For a discussion of the Tax Court's jurisdiction
to hear equitable recoupment claims, see infra note 241 and accompanying text.
Is' Dalm, - U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1372.
186 According to Justice Stevens, the government acknowledged that DaIm "may have
had a sound claim for recoupment, but insist[ed] that to pursue this claim, she should have
'paid the 1976 and 1977 income tax deficiencies and then brought a timely refund suit in
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Justice Stevens inferred that Daim's "limited means foreclosed this
avenue of relief for her[,J" thus compelling her to challenge the
deficiency in the Tax Court. 187 He suggested, "[T]he basis for
[Dam's] equitable recoupment claim did not exist" until the Tax
Court settlement determined that the 1976 transfer was taxable as
income, 188 whereupon she "promptly asserted her recoupment claim
in the only forum available," that is, the district court.189 Since
"the character of the 1976 transaction remained in dispute until
the claim was filed," he found none of the policies underlying the
statute of limitations implicated in the case.' 90
Justice Stevens accused the majority of ignoring such policies,
as well as the principles of just conduct underlying Bull. He further
criticized the majority for deferring to the "majestic voices" of
'jurisdiction' and 'sovereign immunity,"' which "seem[ed to the
majority] to have a haunting charm."' 9' He observed that the
Court, in Bull, similarly could have taken a strict view of the
statute of limitations, but instead "avoided that unjust result" by
construing the rights of a plaintiff in a federal tax action by
reference to those of a defendant, and thus reasoning "under...
the presumption that for every right there should be a remedy." 1 92
He suggested, "By initiating a proceeding to recover income tax
based on the 1976 payment, the Government waived the time bar
that would otherwise have precluded a claim for refund of the gift
tax." 93 Since Dalm's recoupment claim would have been allowed
if raised as the second count in an income tax refund action,
district court or the Claims Court."' Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1372 (citation omitted). He thus
acknowledged the well established rule generally requiring full payment of a tax as a
prerequisite to a refund action. See Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958), aff'd on
rehearing, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
I" Dalm, - U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1372.
'1 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1372. Justice Stevens observed that when Dalm received the
income tax deficiency notice in 1983, the statute of limitations already barred recovery of
the gift tax.
89 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1372.
190 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1372.
9I Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1372.
192 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1372-73 (calling this principle a "bright star in our jurisprudence"
and citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803)). Later, Justice
Stevens acknowledged that treating a plaintiff like a defendant "so as to permit, in effect,
the equitable tolling of a limitations period," was perhaps "an unusually flexible treatment
of legal categories." Still, such treatment may have been "nothing more than the necessary
expression of an exception to a generally appropriate definition," an exception that deserved
the status of a legal rule under Bull. Daim, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1373.
191 Dalm, - U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1373.
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Justice Stevens urged that it be deemed timely even though the
income tax issues were litigated before the Tax Court, "because
the deficiency assessment was sufficient to put in issue the right to
recoupment."'19 4 He further asserted, "If it was not too late for
the Government to litigate the tax consequences of the 1976 pay-
ment, it should not be too late for the taxpayer to do so."' 9
Disputing the majority's statutory analysis, Justice Stevens crit-
icized its use of I.R.C. § 6511(a) to convert the "blanket waiver
of sovereign immunity" granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) into a
"jurisdictional straitjacket."'' 96 He conceded that § 6511(a) might
apply if Dam's suit were an action for the "refund of overpaid
gift tax," but argued that it technically was not such a suit. 197
Specifically, Justice Stevens distinguished two categories of actions
within 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1): actions to recover "any internal-
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected[,]' ' 98 and actions to recover "any sum alleged to have
been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the
internal revenue laws."' 99 He viewed a suit for an "overpaid" gift
tax, to which I.R.C. § 6511(a) would apply, as being within the
first of these categories, but also found that the gravamen of
Dalm's claim was "not that the gift tax was overpaid, but that it
was unjustly retained. ' ' 200 Therefore, he considered the action as
one to recover a sum wrongfully collected within the second cate-
gory of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), to which he considered I.R.C. §
6511(a) inapplicable. 201 He thus concluded that the former section
afforded the district court jurisdiction over Dalm's suit, and that
the latter section did not divest it of such jurisdiction.20 2
'94 Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1373.
19, Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1373.
191 Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1373-74.
7 Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1374.
'- 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(I) (1982).
1' Id.
21 Dalm, - U.S. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 1374. Justice Stevens cited the language
of Bull indicating that although the money was taken through mistake, without any element
of fraud, "'the unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud on the taxpayer's
rights."' Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1374 (citing Bull, 295 U.S. at 261).
-1l Daim, - U.S. at __ , 110 S. Ct. at 1374. Consistent with this analysis,
Justice Stevens emphasized that I.R.C. § 6511(a) applies "only to actions for refund of an
'overpayment of any tax paid by means of a return or a stamp.' Where, as here, a sum
was alleged to be "fraudulently retained," he argued that the statute was technically
inapplicable because it would be "odd to speak of the overpayment of a fraud, and one is
not ordinarily required to file a return in order to be defrauded-even when the Sovereign
is the malefactor." Dalm, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1375.
m2 Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1375.
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Thus, Justice Stevens rebuked the majority for inventing "a
small, but blatant, fiction: that [Dalm] is bringing a suit for the
refund of overpaid gift tax within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §
6511(a)[,]" and using that creation "to serve the vainest of all
legal fictions, the doctrine of sovereign immunity[,]" which he
criticized as an anomalous import from English law based upon
the "polite falsehood" and "ancient myth" that the 'King can
do no wrong."' 2 3 Rather than expand the doctrine, he admonished
that the Court would "do better to interpret [28 U.S.C.] § 1346(a)(1)
by the light of equity and with due regard for the practicalities of
revenue collection discussed in Bull. ' '204
Reiterating that Bull had analogized the rights of a plaintiff in
a tax refund action to those of a defendant, Justice Stevens urged,
"[L]egal concepts must.., permit such flexibility when judgment
demands it.' ' 201 He found it unsurprising that such legal concepts
"should be stressed when the Government taxes a citizen twice
upon inconsistent theories and then subjects the citizen to a Hob-
son's choice among competing fora, each of which provides only
half a remedy. ' ' 206 Further, it was "equally unsurprising, and in
fact encouraging, that such problems occur so rarely that Congress
has not made any provision for them. ' 207 Finally, Justice Stevens
criticized the majority for having "undone equity by rendering an
opinion true to neither the spirit nor the letter of American law[,]"
and dismissed its "grave declaration that a 'distinction that has
jurisdiction as its central concept is not meaningless[,]' as a
"solemn truism" that did not decide the outcome of the case. °20
D. Analysis
The Supreme Court's opinion in Dalm, like its decision over
forty years earlier in Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator
Co.,2°9 delineates the procedural limitations on the applicability of
20 Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1375.
- Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1375.
20 Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1375-76.
Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1375-76. Referring to the mitigation provisions, Justice Stevens
was "not persuaded that because Congress took special steps to ensure that twice-taxed
citizens were treated equitably under some circumstances, Congress must have intended to
gut judicially created doctrines which ensured equitable treatment for twice-taxed citizens
under other circumstances." Citing the work of Professor Andrews, he found the contrary
inference "more plausible." Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1376 n.10.
2w Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1375-76.
Id. at __ 110 S. Ct. at 1376.
20 See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text (discussing Gooch Milling).
[VOL. 80
1990-91] EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT REVISITED
equitable recoupment in federal tax cases.2 10 Specifically, it defines
the limits of equitable recoupment in instances where the taxpayer
has a time-barred refund claim (which she may be able to recoup
210 Due to its disposition of the case on jurisdictional and procedural grounds, the
Court did not determine the substantive merits of Dalm's recoupment claim. In dissent,
Justice Stevens apparently believed the claim had merit, since he thought it "undisputed"
that Dalm could have recovered the 1976 gift tax by paying the asserted income tax deficiency
and bringing a refund suit therefor, by raising recoupment as a second count in that action.
Dalm, - U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1372. Justice Kennedy appeared to have assumed,
without deciding, that the recoupment claim had merit, since he noted that the income tax
deficiency had been asserted on a theory that was inconsistent with that on which Dalm
had relied in paying the gift tax. Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1370. Yet, the facts raise
several interesting questions in this regard.
First, to invoke recoupment, on the classic Bull model, the imposition of both gift tax
and income tax with respect to the 1976 and 1977 transfers must have been fundamentally
inconsistent. In view of the differing aims of the gift tax and the income tax, the two have
not been construed pari materia. See, e.g., Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d
812 (2d Cir. 1947). Thus a determination that a transfer is not a "gift" for income tax
purposes and hence not excludable from the recipient's gross income is not ipso facto
determinative of whether it is, or is not, a gift for gift tax purposes. Compare Commissioner
v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (indicating that a "gift" in the income tax sense
"proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested generosity ... out of affection, respect,
admiration, charity, or like impulses') with I.R.C. § 2512 (1988) (providing that for gift
tax purposes, any transfer of property for "less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth ... shall be deemed a gift. .. ").
Second, the 1976 gift tax was actually imposed upon and paid by Clarence Schrier,
who was only reimbursed by Dalm. In general, only the taxpayer that paid the tax in
question, or a related taxpayer having an identity in interest, may properly assert recoup-
ment. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is questionable whether
Dalm herself could properly have brought suit, timely or not, to recover the gift taxes paid
by Clarence Schrier. See Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Controversies,
48 IowA L. REv. 312, 331 (1963) (indicating that in refund suits generally, even though the
funds for payment of the tax liability were furnished by another, the taxpayer against whom
they were assessed ard from whom they were formally collected is the proper party plaintiff).
Thus, the propriety of allowing Dalm to assert a recoupment claim as to taxes imposed
upon Clarence Schrier is open to some question. Perhaps the doubt should be resolved in
Dalm's favor in view of the fact that she was contingently liable for payment of the gift
tax. See I.R.C. § 2502(c) (1988) (providing that gift tax shall be paid by the donor); id. §
6324(b) (1988) (making the donee personally liable to the extent of the value of the gift if
the gift tax is not paid when due).
Third, the Tax Court settlement found income tax deficiencies of $10,416 for 1976
and $70,639 for 1977, and Dalm's refund suit sought to recover gift taxes and penalties of
approximately $20,000. However, only the 1976 transfers were subjected to gift tax and
hence, only those transfers constituted the single transaction that was taxed twice on
inconsistent theories. Accordingly, even if the Tax Court settlement had not taken the 1976
gift taxes into account, and Dalm were permitted to bring a subsequent independent action
based upon recoupment, the most that she might have recovered on this theory appears to
be S10,416. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19 (indicating that recoupment can only
reduce the amount of the other party's timely claim to zero). Compare Fairley v. United
States, 901 F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 1990), discussed infra note 264 (suggesting this interpretation
of the single transaction requirement).
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against a timely asserted deficiency claim) and contests the defi-
ciency in the Tax Court: in that situation, the taxpayer cannot
thereafter gain access to a federal district court or the United States
Claims Court by using the recoupment claim as an independent
basis for jurisdiction. 21' Since the Ninth Circuit, in Kolom v. United
States, permitted such a claim to serve as the sole basis for the
district court's jurisdiction, the Court's holding in Dalm repudiates
that decision and, conversely, approves the Seventh Circuit's hold-
ing in O'Brien v. United States.21 2 Justice Kennedy's opinion rests
211 Since 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), relied on by the majority in Dalm, also governs
United States Claims Court jurisdiction in federal tax refund matters, its holding would
apply equally to subsequent suits brought there.
2I As Justice Stevens observed, however, O'Brien did not present precisely the same
factual setting as Dalm. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a purported conflict between
the approach of the Sixth Circuit, in Dalm, and Ninth Circuit, in Kolom, 791 F.2d 762,
on the one hand, and the Seventh Circuit, in O'Brien, 766 F.2d 1038, on the other.
Although Justice Stevens denied any such conflict in the cases, they do exhibit differing
attitudes on whether a taxpayer may maintain an independent suit based upon recoupment
for a tax on its face barred by the statute of limitations after the transaction's related tax
consequences are litigated in another action. In Dalm, the Sixth Circuit permitted a suit for
refund of time-barred gift tax even after Dalm litigated the income tax consequences of the
1976 transfers in the Tax Court. In Kolom, which involved a dispute over whether minimum
tax was payable for 1972 or 1973, the Ninth Circuit allowed the taxpayer's action, based
on recoupment, for refund of a time-barred minimum tax for 1973 even after he had
litigated his 1972 minimum tax liability in the Tax Court. The taxpayer (Kolom) exercised
stock options during 1972. The difference between their exercise price and the stock's fair
market value was subject to the minimum tax. Kolom paid the minimum tax for 1973, in
which restrictions on resale of the stock under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 lapsed, and not 1972, in which the options were exercised. The Commissioner's
determination that the minimum tax was payable for 1972 was sustained by the Tax Court
and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in 1981. Kolom paid the resulting assessment and sought
a refund of the 1973 minimum tax, then barred by the statute of limitations. The district
court, relying on the I.R.C. mitigation provisions, granted him summary judgment. The
Ninth Circuit modified and affirmed, holding that although the mitigation provisions did
not apply, equitable recoupment supported the suit because the exercise of the options had
been subjected to two taxes on inconsistent theories. Thus, in Kolom, as in Dalm, recoup-
ment was permitted even though, after the respective Tax Court actions, there was no
longer any timely underlying action against which recoupment could be asserted.
In O'Brien, the taxpayer (O'Brien) was the son of a decedent that died in 1974 but
had made inter-vivos transfers of stock to his children directly and in trust. These transfers
were made in contemplation of death, causing the stock's value to be subjected to federal
estate tax at its date-of-death fair market value, reported by the estate as approximately
$215 per share. The Commissioner disputed this valuation and determined an estate tax
deficiency, which the estate contested in the Tax Court. During 1975, O'Brien reported gain
on the liquidation of the corporation by using the $215 per share value as his adjusted basis
in the stock. In April 1980, the Tax Court issued a stipulated order, in the estate tax case,
setting the stock's date-of-death value at approximately $280 per share. In April 1981,
O'Brien sought an income tax refund alleging that he should have used a basis of $280 per
share, not $215 per share in determining the gain resulting from the 1975 liquidation. The
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upon a straightforward analysis of the statutory framework gov-
erning district court jurisdiction and the limitations period for tax
refund actions, and a reading of the Court's prior cases allowing
equitable recoupment (i.e., Bull and Stone) that was in harmony
with this framework. The opinion is consistent with the prior
judicial development of the doctrine and the "two wrongs make a
right" theory of equitable recoupment, which emphasizes, "[R]ather
than extending the statute of limitations to correct a perceived
injustice, [the doctrine] permits a wronged party to recoup the loss
against a sum still open to litigation. ' 213 In this light, Justice
Kennedy's reading of the limits of Bull and Stone, and his conclu-
sion that the doctrine must be raised in the context of a timely
filed suit, are appropriate. Although his emphasis on jurisdiction
district court granted him summary judgment, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding
that neither the mitigation provisions nor equitable recoupment applied. It stressed that
recoupment could not be used as an independent ground for reopening years closed by the
statute of limitations and that the doctrine requires "the timeliness of the underlying action
against which a party seeks to employ recoupment." O'Brien, 766 F.2d at 1049. Unlike the
Ninth and Sixth Circuits in Kolom and Daim, the Seventh Circuit refused to permit
recoupment to serve as the basis of an independent action for the refund of a tax barred
by the statute of limitations.
Justice Stevens contended that O'Brien "was not a case in which a taxpayer sought to
litigate a recoupment claim in district court after litigating in Tax Court the assessment
which generated the recoupment claim." Further, O'Brien "held that only the estate, not
the beneficiary, could assert any available recoupment claim." Dam, - U.S. at
-, 110 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He maintained that the Seventh
Circuit had not spoken to the issue in Daim, or if it had, "[I]ts remarks were obviously
dicta." Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2. It is true that, unlike Dalm and Kolom, O'Brien himself
had not been the subject of a deficiency determination that he litigated individually in the
Tax Court. Yet, nothing in the Seventh Circuit's opinion suggests that it would have treated
his action more favorably if he had or, more importantly, that it would have permitted the
estate there to raise recoupment in an independent action after it had litigated the estate
tax deficiency in the Tax Court. Indeed, the contrary inference seems more plausible since,
in discussing how recoupment might have applied, the Seventh Circuit indicated that the
estate might have raised the doctrine with respect to O'Brien's "erroneous overpayment of
gain in the 1975 proceeding which resolved the dispute over stock valuation for estate tax
purposes." O'Brien, 766 F.2d at 1050 (emphasis added). It also observed that by litigating
in the Tax Court, the estate may have waived any claim for recoupment. Id. at 1050 n.15.
This suggests that the Seventh Circuit might have permitted the estate to recoup O'Brien's
income tax overpayment in a proceeding relating to its estate tax liability, but would not
have permitted even the estate to assert recoupment as the basis for a separate, independent
action after it had litigated the estate tax deficiency in the Tax Court. Thus, the Seventh
Circuit would probably have reached a result opposite to the Sixth Circuit on the facts of
Dalm.
21' Willis, supra note 20, at 633. The "two wrongs make a right" notion signifies that
where an earlier matter has received erroneous tax treatment, "This [recoupment] does not
correct the wrong as does the mitigation statute ... but instead causes a later matter to be
equally wrong in the opposite direction." Id.
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and sovereign immunity may appear surprising, it finds support in
the case law. It generally has been held that where a refund claim
has not been filed within the time prescribed by I.R.C. § 6511(a),
a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a refund suit,2 4 and
that I.R.C. 6511(a) constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity that
is to be narrowly construed. 215
Beyond its specific holding, several aspects of the majority's
opinion are noteworthy. First, despite the denial of relief to tax-
payers that follow the procedural route taken by Dalm, Justice
214 See, e.g., Swietlik v. United States, 779 F.2d 1306, 1311 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The
statute of limitations in . . . [section 6511(a)] is jurisdictional, meaning that the government
does not forfeit reliance on it by failing to plead it, as it would with an ordinary affirmative
defense."); Rosenbluth Trading, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The
filing of a timely refund claim is a jurisdictional requirement, which cannot be waived.");
Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317, 321 (3d. Cir. 1976) ("Unlike general statutes of
limitation which govern independently existing causes of action between private parties, the
timeliness requirement at issue here is not procedural or 'remedial' but jurisdictional.");
Essex v. Vinal, 499 F.2d 226, 231 (8th Cir. 1974) ("The filing of a timely claim for refund
under 7422(a) is a prerequisite to a tax refund suit and is a jurisdictional requirement that
cannot be waived."); see also Little People's School, Inc. v. United States, 842 F.2d 570
(Ist Cir. 1988); Miller v. United States, 784 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. United
States, 18 Cl. Ct. 53 (1988). See generally Ferguson, supra note 210, at 338-39 & n.135.
Cf. Hatter v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 786 (1990). In Hatter, the Claims Court held that
because no refund claim had been filed, it lacked jurisdiction over a suit by ten Federal
judges claiming that their compensation had been unconstitutionally diminished by the
Social Security Amendments of 1983, which required withholding of Social Security taxes
from their salaries. "[H]owever artfully characterized," this was a suit for the recovery of
social security taxes and therefore subject to the claim requirements of I.R.C. § 7422.
Hatter, 21 Cl. Ct. at 789.
2" See, e.g., Swietlik, 779 F.2d at 1311 ("The grounds for tolling statutes of limitations
are more limited in suits against the government than in ordinary private litigation .... If
the line seems artificial-if the principles that delimit it seem merely the archaic remnants
of the much criticized doctrine of sovereign immunity-nevertheless it is too well established
for us to shift it in [the taxpayer's] favor."); Kreiger, 539 F.2d at 320-321 (holding that
taxpayer's argument for statute of limitations tolling "[ran] afoul of the well-established
principle that statutes of limitation applicable to suits against the government are conditions
attached to the sovereign's consent to be sued and must be strictly construed .... These
principles are as applicable to tax refund suits as to any other suit against the sovereign.");
see also Schaeffer v. United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9680 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
Some cases have not emphasized or discussed this "sovereign immunity" aspect of the
statute of limitations against the government. In some cases, the Supreme Court has relied
upon the policy of finality and repose fostered by statutes of limitations, under which "both
parties to taxation are affected impartially." Electric Storage Battery, 329 U.S. at 302 n.3;
see also Hufbauer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 247, 251 (S.D. Cal. 1968) (allowing
recoupment and stating, "[A] mere technical statute of limitations bar is the only apparent
obstruction to a refund. . . ."); cf. S. REp. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), reprinted
in 1939 C.B. 779, 815 (accompanying enactment of the mitigation provisions, not discussing
sovereign immunity but instead indicating that a fundamental purpose of the statute of
limitations is to prevent the litigation of stale claims).
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Kennedy's declaration that taxpayers may still assert equitable re-
coupment, either at the administrative level or before a "court
which has jurisdiction over a timely suit for refund, ' 21 6 is heart-
ening. Even if it is dictum, it at least indicates that, subject to the
limits of the Court's opinion, equitable recoupment remains viable.
Although the lower courts generally have assumed that recoupment
survived in limited form,2 17 this statement in Dalm affirms the
doctrine's continuation.
Yet, this encouraging note seems potentially undercut by Justice
Kennedy's assertion, against the backdrop of sovereign immunity
and the principle that Congress alone has the power to consent to
suits, that since Dalm was not eligible for relief under the mitiga-
tion provisions, allowing her to use recoupment would in effect be
overriding Congress's judgment as to when equity requires an
exception to the limitations bar.218 Justice Kennedy's reliance on
the mitigation provisions for this purpose is troubling because it
suggests that those provisions represent preemptive, exclusive ex-
ceptions to the limitations bar. Applied strictly, this assumption
would wholly subjugate the judicially developed principles of eq-
uitable recoupment. Such a view is inconsistent with the pertinent
legislative history and case law concerning the mitigation provi-
sions.
The legislative history accompanying the enactment of the mit-
igation provisions of the Revenue Act of 1938 expressly states that
Congress perceived a need to "supplement" the equitable principles
theretofore developed by the courts. 2 9 And while the government
216 See supra text accompanying note 166.
217 See supra note 89. See generally Andrews, supra note 16, at 611-613; Willis, supra
note 20, at 640 (lower courts allow equitable recoupment "where the same or single
transaction, item or taxable event was present, despite McEachern. ..
218 Dalm, - U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1369.
219 The Senate Report accompanying enactment of the Revenue Act of 1938 provides,
in pertinent part:
The Federal courts in many somewhat similar tax cases have sought to prevent
inequitable results by applying principles variously designated as estoppel,
quasi estoppel, recoupment and set-off. For various reasons, mostly technical,
these judicial efforts can not extend to all problems of this type. Legislation
has long been needed to supplement the equitable principles applied by the
courts and to check the growing volume of litigation by taking the profit out
of inconsistency, whether exhibited by taxpayers or revenue officials and
whether fortuitous or by design.
S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 48 (1938), reprinted in 1939 C.B. 779, 814. For
excellent descriptions of the development of judicial doctrines prior to the enactment of the
mitigation provisions, see First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. United States, 565 F.2d 507 (8th
Cir. 1977); Andrews, supra note 16, at 619-623; Willis, supra note 20, at 633-640.
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has sometimes argued that these provisions supersede the doctrine
of equitable recoupment, no case has endorsed this view.Y0
Some courts have held that the mitigation provisions operate
with limited exclusivity. For example, in Benenson v. United
States,21 the Second Circuit reasoned that recoupment, as "an
equitable remedy not specifically authorized by the Internal Reve-
nue Code ... should not be applied where there appears to be a
full and adequate remedy under the [mitigation] provisions of the
Code. ' 22 It concluded that if a situation falls within the general
scope of the mitigation provisions but fails to meet each statutory
requirement, a court should not permit recoupment, but should
instead treat the mitigation provisions as exclusive.m The court
declined to apply recoupment since it appeared that relief would
be available under the mitigation provisions. =4 While this view is
apparently shared by the Claims Court,22 not all courts have
2" See O'Brien, 766 F.2d at 1050 n.14 (having determined that taxpayer did not satisfy
requirements for recoupment court found it unnecessary to address the government's "ar-
gument that the mitigation provisions, though inapplicable to these facts, provide the
exclusive remedy for plaintiff's predicament, thus barring a claim based on equitable
recoupment"); Hufbauer, 297 F. Supp. at 251-52 (rejecting the government's argument that
"the defense of equitable recoupment has been preempted or superseded" by the enactment
of the mitigation provisions because: (1) the government had itself asserted the recoupment's
continuing viability where the doctrine could work in its favor; (2) Congress would have so
provided had it intended pre-emption; and (3) in a "thorough discussion of recoupment in
Electric Storage Battery, no such suggestion was made").
-1 385 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1967).
m Benenson v. United States, 385 F.2d 26, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1967); accord Wells Fargo
Bank & Union Trust Co. v. United States, 245 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1957) (denying recoupment
to the government where relief was available under the mitigation provisions).
22 Benenson, 385 F.2d at 32-34. The court suggested that this approach would present
problems rarely since in most cases, adjustment under the mitigation provisions "is com-
monly regarded as a fairer remedy than recoupment." Id. at 32 n.8. For a discussion of
relief available under the doctrine of equitable recoupment and the mitigation provisions,
see supra note 119.
22 The court found that the mitigation provisions require that there be a "determi-
nation" (as defined in I.R.C. § 1313(a) (1988)) and that the taxpayer file a refund claim
for the amount of the adjustment after such determination. The court doubted whether
there could be a "determination" before its decision became final, and noted that even if
the district court's decision constituted such a "determination," no refund claim had yet
been filed. Benenson, 385 F.2d at 31. Therefore, having completed no more than one of
the required steps, the taxpayers were not yet entitled to a refund under the mitigation
provisions.
21 See Gooding v. United States, 326 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1964). There, the taxpayers
entitled to relief under the mitigation provisions were precluded from using recoupment.
The Court stated, "When Congress established the detailed provisions of the mitigation
sections it intended, we think, that they supersede any common-law recoupment remedies
with respect to the categories designated in section 1312. Since plaintiffs are covered by
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embraced it unqualifiedly. 226 For example, in First National Bank
section 1312(7), they must accept the bounds of the relief Congress has granted." Id. at
996-96.
Although dictum in Benenson suggests that recoupment should be denied if a situation
falls within the general scope of the statutory provisions but does not meet each requirement
of the statute, it appeared that the taxpayers there would ultimately obtain relief under the
mitigation provisions. Indeed, the court indicated that recoupment should not be applied
where there is a full and adequate remedy at law, and inquired "whether it appears that
the mitigation provisions will give [the taxpayers] an adequate remedy once they have
complied with all the statutory procedures." Benenson, 385 F.2d at 32. It determined that
they would and thus viewed the mitigation provisions as the exclusive remedy. Similarly, in
Gooding, the taxpayers were actually entitled to relief under the mitigation provisions.
Those cases should be contrasted with the Court of Claim's apparently stricter holding in
Brigham v. United States, 470 F.2d 571 (Ct. CI. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973).
In Brigham, a circumstance of adjustment described in I.R.C. § 1312(7) (1988) was involved,
but the taxpayers were held not entitled to relief under the mitigation provisions because
the Commissioner had not maintained an inconsistent position as required by I.R.C. §
1311(b) (1988). Furthermore, relying on Gooding, the court held that the mitigation provi-
sions supersede any common law recoupment remedies with respect to the categories des-
ignated in § 1312. Since the situation was purportedly described in § 1312(7), the court also
denied recoupment. Thus, Brigham holds that where the facts involve a circumstance of
adjustment described in § 1312, recoupment is not available and the mitigation provisions
constitute the sole avenue of redress, even if they fail to provide an actual remedy because
some other prerequisite for relief thereunder is not satisfied and, unlike the situation in
Benenson, can never be satisfied. Id. at 577. Although this result is consistent with dictum
in Benenson and finds support among certain commentators cited therein, see Benenson,
385 F.2d at 31, 32 n.8 (citing Note, Equitable Recoupment in Tax Law, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv.
537, 543 (1967) and Maguire, Surrey & Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938,
48 YALE L.J. 719, 775 n.195 (1939)), it extends the holding of Benenson beyond its precise
facts. It should be noted, however, that independent of its holding on the exclusivity of the
mitigation provisions, the court in Brigham found that the taxpayers were in any event
ineligible for recoupment because, inter alia, they were seeking to assert it not as a defense
to a deficiency, but as an independent ground for reopening the statute of limitations.
Brigham, 470 F.2d at 577-78. For a discussion of this aspect of Brigham, see supra note
114.
See Bank of Omaha, 565 F.2d 507; see also Hufbauer, 297 F. Supp. 247. For a
discussion of Bank of Omaha, see supra note 220. For a discussion of Hufbauer, see text
accompanying notes 227-28, infra. The Hufbauer court held that recoupment was available
and not preempted by the mitigation provisions even though they purport to grant relief
from double inclusion situations for some "related persons" but not corporations and sole
shareholders, an issue in the case. Technically, Hufbauer is not inconsistent with the court's
decision in Brigham, which treated the mitigation provisions as exclusive when the facts
involve a circumstance of adjustment described in I.R.C. §§ 1312(1) through 1312(7) because
it did not involve any such circumstance of adjustment. The only possibly applicable
circumstance of adjustment was described in § 1312(1), i.e., "the inclusion in gross income
of an item which was erroneously included ... in the gross income of a related taxpayer."
(emphasis added). In Hufbauer, an individual was required to include in his gross income
an item of income that had been included erroneously in the gross income of his controlled
corporation. However, a corporation and its sole shareholder are not "related taxpayers"
as defined in I.R.C. § 1313(c) (1988). Because the corporation was thus not a "related
taxpayer" with respect to him, the item included in the individual's gross income had not
been "erroneously included ... in the gross income of a related taxpayer" as contemplated
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of Omaha v. United States,227 the Eighth Circuit concluded that
the mitigation provisions and equitable recoupment could apply
together, permitting the taxpayers to use the mitigation provisions
to recover an otherwise time-barred overpayment and the govern-
ment to use recoupment to reduce the amount recoverable. 228
by § 1312(1). Therefore, there was no "circumstance of adjustment" that would, under
Brigham, render the mitigation provisions the sole source of relief. This view, however
technical, finds support in Maguire, Surrey & Traynor, supra note 225, at 773-75. The
authors reason that previously existing judicial doctrines are unaffected in cases intentionally
excluded by Congress from a general class covered by the mitigation provisions, such as
those involving related taxpayers not enumerated in the statute. Id. at 775 n.198. But see
Note, supra note 225, at 543 ("[N]either a taxpayer nor the Government can obtain equitable
relief by recoupment if the court finds that the situation falls within the general scope of
one of the statutory provisions but does not meet each requirement of the statute since the
Code remedy is considered exclusive within the defined areas.").
565 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1977).
21 In Bank of Omaha, a decedent had erroneously treated as constructively received
certain liquidation proceeds that were ultimately received by, and taxed as income to, her
estate and a trust created by her. The court permitted the taxpayers to recover under the
mitigation provisions the otherwise time-barred refund of the decedent's income tax over-
payment, and the government to recoup against this amount any increase in estate tax that
would have resulted if the value of this refund claim had been included as an asset in the
decedent's gross estate.
In concluding that the mitigation provisions and recoupment could thus be applied
together, the Court carefully traced the case law development of the doctrines of setoff and
recoupment prior to the enactment of these provisions. It found that the mitigation provi-
sions were intended to supplement these equitable principles except where a contrary intent
is shown. Bank of Omaha, 565 F.2d at 516 n.17. Since I.R.C. § 1314(c) (1988) provides
that a refund payable under the mitigation provisions is not to be "diminished by any 'set-
off based upon any item other than the one which was the subject of the adjustment,"'
the court concluded that Congress intended to foreclose the re-audit approach of Lewis v.
Reynolds, in making adjustments under the mitigation provisions. By contrast, the statutory
scheme revealed "no reason to think that Congress intended to limit Bull and Stone which
involved multiple treatment of funds arising from a single transaction." Id. at 518. Con-
cluding that all tax liabilities had resulted from a single transaction (i.e., the treatment of
the liquidation proceeds) it permitted the government to recoup against the refund otherwise
payable "whatever other taxes, income or estate, that might be due the government," under
a recoupment theory, including any increased estate tax that would have resulted if the
value of this refund claim had been included as an asset in the decedent's gross estate. Id.
at 518.
The Eighth Circuit noted the Court of Claims's stance in Brigham that the mitigation
provisions are the exclusive remedy in the area where they apply, but distinguished that
case on the grounds that neither the mitigation provisions nor recoupment applied therein
and suggested that the Brigham court was incorrect to the extent that it conflicted with the
Eighth Circuit's analysis. Id. at 516 n.17.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that the mitigation provisions do not supersede or displace
equitable recoupment. It should also be noted that its conclusion that the "single transac-
tion" requirement was satisfied conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Estate of Mann
v. United States, 731 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1984), discussed supra note 106 (allowing an estate
to obtain a refund of income taxes overpaid by the decedent and denying the government's
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Yet even the "limited exclusivity" approach described above
does not support the conclusion that the mitigation provisions
reflect Congress's intent to deny recoupment to taxpayers in Daim's
situation. That approach only treats the mitigation provisions as
exclusive in circumstances where they do purport to apply. They
clearly do not preclude application of equitable doctrines, including
recoupment, where they do not purport to apply.229
Significantly, the mitigation provisions purport to deal solely
with inconsistencies involving income taxes, 230 and not those in-
volving income and estate taxes or income and gift taxes. 231 Since
Dalm involved gift and income taxes, the mitigation provisions did
not even purport to apply and accordingly would not be treated as
displacing the doctrine of equitable recoupment. 2 2 Therefore, to
the extent Justice Kennedy's reliance on the mitigation provisions
to deny recoupment implies that such provisions are an exclusive
remedy, especially as to cases involving facts similar to those in
Dalm, it is misplaced and inconsistent with Congress's avowed
intent to supplement, rather than displace, existing equitable prin-
ciples.233
recoupment claim for the federal estate tax liability resulting from the estate's failure to
include the refund claim as part of the gross estate). See generally Andrews, supra note 16,
at 633 n.238 (discussing the problems of applying recoupment in such a situation).
2" In Benenson, Gooding, and Brigham, a "circumstance of adjustment" was present
and the mitigation provisions did purport to apply. See supra note 225. And, despite their
apparent divergence of views concerning cases like Hufbauer, described supra note 226,
commentators have agreed that the mitigation provisions do not prevent application of
judicial doctrines to those classes of cases to which they do not purport to apply. See
Maguire, Surrey & Traynor, supra note 225, at 773, 775 n.119 (citing as examples "[c]ases
involving interaction of the estate tax and the income tax. . ."); Note, supra note 225, at
543-544 ("Since sections 1311-1314 apply exclusively to income taxes, the statute would be
inapplicable should the inconsistent treatment of a taxable event affect the computation of
another tax such as an estate tax. Furthermore, where none of the circumstances described
in section 1312 is involved, statutory relief would be neither available nor preemptive.
Equitable recoupment might be available, however, to correct the inconsistent treatment in
either of these cases."); see also Andrews, supra note 16, at 622-623 & n.174.
m" See Andrews, supra note 16, at 621 n.151; Willis, supra note 20, at 648-654.
2' See Georgia Ketteman Trust v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 91, 110 (1986) (holding
mitigation not applicable to gift taxes); see also Maguire, Surrey & Traynor, supra note
225; Note, supra note 225, at 543-44. See also United States v. Provident National Bank,
507 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (mitigation provisions applicable to situations involving
income taxes only, and not one involving income tax and estate tax). Apparently, as noted
by Professor Andrews, the only exception is Chertkof v. United States, 676 F.2d 984 (4th
Cir. 1982), permitting mitigation in a case involving income and estate taxes, and criticized
in Willis, supra note 20. See Andrews, supra note 16, at 621 n.151. See generally Willis,
supra note 20.
2 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 623 n.174.
23 By contrast, Justice Stevens was "not persuaded that because Congress took special
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Perhaps most striking, however, was the majority's narrow
approach to the issue before it, with seeming indifference to the
broader operation of the tax collection and litigation processes, 234
and the harsh practical consequences of its holding thereunder. In
this respect, Justice Stevens's criticism of the majority's opinion as
"remarkable not for what it says but rather for what it leaves
unsaid" was justified. 235 For, unlike certain taxpayers to whom
recoupment has been allowed despite their arguable lack of dili-
gence, 23 6 Dalm apparently could not have protected herself by
immediately filing a gift tax refund claim upon receiving the income
tax deficiency notice, because the statute of limitations on such a
claim had already expired. 2 7 Since the mitigation provisions af-
forded no solace, 238 Dalm's only avenue for relief was the doctrine
of equitable recoupment.
The majority implicitly sanctioned the government's contention
that although Dalm "may have had a sound claim for recoupment,
... to pursue this claim she should have 'paid the 1976 and 1977
deficiencies and then brought a timely refund suit in district court
or the Claims Court."' 239 But its opinion nowhere acknowledged,
as Justice Stevens did, that to have gained access to these refund
fora, Dalm would have had to pay the full amount of the asserted
deficiencies-over $91,000 and $70,000, respectively. 240 Rather, it
steps to ensure that twice-taxed citizens were treated equitably under some circumstances,
Congress must have intended to gut judicially created doctrines which ensured equitable
treatment for twice-taxed citizens under other circumstances," and instead found the con-
trary inference "more plausible." Dalm, - U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1376 n.10
(citing Andrews, supra note 16, at 619-623).
21 This approach is in contrast with Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 157 (1960),
aff'g on rehearing 357 U.S. 63 (1958), where, in articulating the "full payment" rule, the
Court looked to the role of tax refund actions within "a carefully articulated and quite
complicated structure of tax laws." For a discussion of the "full payment" rule, see infra
note 240.
-' Daim, - U.S. at _, 110 S. Ct at 1370.
26 See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
'3 See supra note 135.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 230-32.
211 Dalm, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1372 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
14 The so called "full payment" rule of Flora, 362 U.S. 145 (1960), aff'g on rehearing
357 U.S. 63 (1958), generally requires that a taxpayer pay the full amount of a tax as a
prerequisite for bringing a refund suit therefor. Absent payment, a court lacks jurisdiction
of the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). See generally Andrews, supra note 16, at 595;
Ferguson, supra note 210, at 331-36. Justice Stevens was obviously aware of the rule, since
he noted that while a more affluent taxpayer might have paid the asserted deficiencies and
followed the procedural route suggested by the government and sanctioned by the majority,
it was reasonable to infer that Dalm lacked the means to do so and therefore challenged
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obscured this fact by noting that Dalm chose to litigate the income
tax deficiencies before the Tax Court without raising a recoupment
claim there, and was now trying to enter the district court by using
recoupment as the sole basis for jurisdiction; this created the
impression that Dalm sought "two bites" at the recoupment "ap-
ple." To the extent that it suggests that the Tax Court would have
been amenable to hearing her recoupment claim, this aspect of the
majority's opinion is again potentially misleading. Although the
majority explicitly avoided that precise issue, it seems virtually
certain that the Tax Court would have rejected Dalm's recoupment
claim because it believed that it lacked jurisdiction to apply the
doctrine. 24' The majority opinion may thus create the erroneous
the deficiencies in the Tax Court. See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
The government's assertion that Dalm should have paid both the 1976 and 1977 income
tax deficiencies and thereafter filed a refund suit in which she could have raised recoupment,
seems to overstate the case. Since Daim paid gift tax with respect to only the 1976 transfer,
her recoupment claim presumably related to only the 1976 income tax deficiency. Even
though the deficiencies for both years were determined in the same notice, each year's
deficiency constitutes a separate cause of action. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591, 598 (1948) ("Each year is the origin of a new liability and of a separate cause of
action."); O'Neil v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 105 (1976) ("The fact that separate taxable
years are contained in one notice of deficiency does not mean that each of such years is
automatically raised by filing a petition contesting some of such years." (citations omitted)).
Therefore, Dalm could have filed a petition with respect to the 1977 deficiency in the Tax
Court, while paying the 1976 deficiency, and then brought a claim and suit for refund with
respect to the latter based upon equitable recoupment. Nevertheless, even on this view, the
fact remains that she would have had to pay the full amount of the asserted deficiency for
1976, over $91,000, in order to gain access to a refund forum where she could raise the
recoupment claim.
2,' Since the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator
Co., discussed supra note 68, the Tax Court has consistently held that it lacks jurisdiction
to apply equitable recoupment, relying upon one or more different grounds. Sometimes, it
has relied upon I.R.C. § 6214(b) (1988), the modern day successor to § 272(g) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, cited by the Supreme Court in Gooch Milling. See Stoller
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1554 (1990) (decided after and citing Dalm); Estate of
Van Winkle v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 994 (1969); Vandenberge v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.
321 (1944), aff'd, 147 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 875 (1945).
Sometimes, the court has cited a lack of "general equitable powers." See Miller v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 940 (1963). The Tax Court has also denied recoupment on the
grounds that the tax sought to be recouped was not one of the types of taxes within its
statutorily granted jurisdiction. See Phillips Petroleum, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 885
(1989) (holding that taxpayer could not recoup excise tax overpayment against income tax
deficiency because Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over a particular excise tax); Purdy v.
Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 74 (1982) (holding that taxpayer could not recoup FICA
tax overpayment against income tax deficiency because Tax Court has no jurisdiction over
FICA taxes).
Similarly, treating the issuance of a notice of a deficiency concerning a particular tax
as a prerequisite to its jurisdiction over that tax, the court has denied recoupment where
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impression that the Tax Court currently would be amenable to
applying recoupment. 242
the taxpayer sought to recoup a tax for which no deficiency had been determined, even
though, if one had been, the tax would be within the Tax Court's statutory jurisdiction.
See Estate of Schneider v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 568 (1989) (holding that since only an
income tax deficiency had been determined and a petition filed with respect thereto, under
a "Herring-Bowcut model," the court lacked jurisdiction over estate taxes paid by the
taxpayer and therefore could not permit recoupment of an estate tax overpayment an against
income tax deficiency). In light of such cases, it seems disingenuous for the majority to
justify its conclusion, at least in part, upon Dalm's failure to raise a recoupment claim in
the Tax Court.
The position of the Tax Court concerning equitable recoupment claims was certainly
recognized by commentators at the time of the Court's decision in Dalm. See Andrews,
supra note 16, at 648 (noting that "equitable recoupment may be raised in either the
appropriate federal district court or the United States Claims Court, but not in the United
States Tax Court"); see also id. at 613-15, 626; Willis, supra note 20, at 641-642 n.130
(noting that "the Tax Court ... has no equitable jurisdiction and thus cannot consider
recoupment," and concluding that a taxpayer that litigated a deficiency in Tax Court
"essentially waived" the remedy of recoupment by so doing).
In contrast to the majority, Justice Stevens acknowledged that, at least in the view of
the parties, the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a recoupment claim. See Dalm,
.U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1371-72. He commended the majority for its careful
reservation of this issue, and noted that if the Court were to eventually decide that the Tax
Court did have such jurisdiction, Dalm would become a dead letter since "[n]o taxpayer
would have any reason to litigate the deficiency and the recoupment issues separately, and
in any event a judgment upon the former would bar a subsequent suit upon the latter under
the doctrine of res judicata." Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1372 n.3.
22 The majority's opinion may have been so interpreted in Fisher v. United States,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15229 (N.D. Cal.), in which the Commissioner determined a
deficiency for 1976 and corresponding overassessments for 1977 and 1978. The taxpayers
filed a Tax Court petition contesting the 1976 deficiency, but failed to timely file formal
refund claims for the 1977 and 1978 overassessments, although the notice of deficiency so
advised. After filing formal refund claims that were denied as untimely, the taxpayers
brought a refund suit. The court allowed the suit, finding that the taxpayers' filing of the
petition and the inclusion therein of the statutory notice was an informal refund claim that
was later perfected by the formal claims.
Although this conclusion was sufficient to deny the government's motion to dismiss,
the court addressed the taxpayers' alternative argument that they were entitled to relief
under the doctrine of equitable recoupment. It noted Dalm's holding that a 'party litigating
a tax claim in a timely proceeding may, in that proceeding, seek recoupment of a related,
but now time barred tax claim relating to the same transaction."' Id. at 10 (citing United
States v. Dam, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 1361, 1368). Then, seemingly in contradiction
of its earlier conclusion that the suit should not be dismissed because it was not time-
barred, and inexplicably distinguishing for this purpose the formal and informal claims, the
court stated, "[P]laintiff's do not assert that their formal refund claims were timely made
in this court. . . ." Id. at 10. From this, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were "not
entitled to invoke recoupment in this proceeding. They may, however, seek to invoke the
doctrine in their Tax Court proceeding, in which the petition concerning 1976 liability was
timely filed." Id. at 10. This conclusion seems erroneous in two respects. First, as indicated,
notwithstanding the contrary implication in Dalm, the Tax Court has generally been thought
to lack jurisdiction to apply recoupment. Thus, the taxpayers could not successfully "seek
EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT REVISITED
The majority failed to acknowledge that, taking these consid-
erations together, its holding effectively requires a taxpayer having
a viable recoupment claim as a defense to the government's defi-
ciency assertion first to bring suit in a refund forum, which in turn
requires payment of the full amount of the asserted deficiency, in
order to have a court hear the recoupment claim. A taxpayer who
contests the deficiency determination in the Tax Court will be
precluded from raising the recoupment claim either in the Tax
Court itself24 or in a separate, subsequent action.
By contrast, Justice Stevens recognized the harsh result of the
Court's holding. He noted the parties' belief that recoupment was
unavailable in the Tax Court24 and the particular severity of the
majority's holding upon less affluent taxpayers. He further ob-
served that those lacking the funds to gain access to a refund
forum faced "a Hobson's choice among competing fora, each of
which provides only half a remedy." 245 In valiantly struggling to
avoid what he perceived as a clearly inequitable result, Justice
Stevens advanced a number of attractive arguments. For example,
he argued that "by initiating a procedure to recover income tax
based on the 1976 payment, the Government waived the time bar
that would otherwise have precluded a claim for refund of the gift
tax. ' " This assertion finds support in the language of BuIl 47 and
to invoke the doctrine in their Tax Court proceeding." Second, the court appears to have
misconstrued recoupment, under which a time-barred refund claim could be used as a
defense to a timely asserted deficiency claim. Since the court had already determined that
the refund suit was not barred by the statute of limitations, there would be no need to
resort to the doctrine of equitable recoupment, because both the government's deficiency
claim for 1976 and the taxpayer's refund claims for 1977 and 1978 would be considered
timely.
141 For a discussion of Tax Court jurisdiction and recoupment, see supra note 241.
2 Justice Stevens agreed that Dalm presented no occasion to decide whether the Tax
Court has jurisdiction to apply recoupment and commended the majority's careful reser-
vation of the issue, but found it "appropriate to assume for purposes of the jurisdictional
issue in this case that respondent's counsel correctly believed that no recoupment could be
had in the Tax Court." Dalm, - U.S. at __, 110 S. Ct. at 1372 n.3.
24, Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1376.
Id. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 1373.
24 Justice Stevens noted that the Court in Bull had stated, "To the objection that the
sovereign is not liable to respond to the petitioner the answer is that it has given him a
right of credit or refund, which though he could not assert it in an action brought by him
in 1930, had accrued and was available to him since it was actionable and not barred in
1925 when the government proceeded against him for the collection of income tax." Id. at
, 10 S. Ct. at 1373 n.4 (citing Bull, 295 U.S. at 260-61).
By implying that the government's action "gave" the taxpayer the right to proceed,
this language supports the idea of a governmental waiver of the statute of limitations. See
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in several non-tax cases applying recoupment, which hold that when
the government sues, it waives sovereign immunity as to claims of
the defendant arising out of the same transaction. 28 Justice Stevens
also observed that the case did not involve any of the policies that
normally support the application of a statute of limitations. 249
Yet, despite his formidable efforts, Justice Stevens's opinion
presents considerable difficulties. On a minor point, the opinion
seems internally inconsistent regarding when Dalm's recoupment
claim became viable, suggesting at one point that the basis for the
supra text accompanying note 123. Nevertheless, such a waiver might be limited to claims
raised in an action relating to the timely determined deficiency itself and not in a subsequent,
separate action. Indeed, to treat the government's action as an absolute, unconditional
waiver of the statute of limitations would suggest, contrary to the weight of authority, that
recoupment could be used as the basis for an affirmative recovery, rather than to merely
reduce the other party's timely claim to zero. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
14 In Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1967), the court held the
government's institution of a suit against guarantor of a promissory note to collect the
balance of an unpaid judgment waived sovereign immunity as to the defendant's claim of
fraud in the government's sale of the mortgaged property. There, the court observed:
The waiver [of sovereign immunity] can be by statutory consent to be sued or
by the institution of the particular action. Our conclusion is that when the
sovereign sues it waives immunity as to claims of the defendant which assert
matters in recoupment-arising out of the same transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the government's suit and to the extent of
defeating the government's claim but not to the extent of a judgment against
the government which is affirmative in the sense of involving relief different
in kind or nature to that sought by the government or in the sense of exceeding
the government's claims.
Frederick, 386 F.2d at 488 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also Livera v. First Nat'l
State Bank of N.J., 879 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson, 853 F.2d 619
(8th Cir. 1988); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982); FDIC v. Citizens Bank & Trust
Co., 592 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1979).
These cases agree that where a governmental entity brings suit, sovereign immunity
does not bar a counterclaim of the defendant that arises out of the same transaction giving
rise to the government's claim. However, in each case where it was permitted, the counter-
claim was asserted in the same action in which the government's claim (the main claim)
was litigated. Thus, such cases can be read to hold that the government's waiver of sovereign
immunity extends only to claims (or counterclaims) that are litigated in the same forum as
the government's main claim. Such a reading would not sanction the procedural route taken
by Dalm, since she contested the government's main claim (the income tax deficiency) in
one forum (the Tax Court) and then sought to litigate the analogous counterclaim (recoup-
ment of the estate tax overpayment) in a different forum (the district court).
141 Unfortunately, Justice Stevens did not specifically identify those policy reasons. A
principal policy served by a statute of limitations is that of finality. A related policy is the
avoidance of litigation where evidence concerning a claim is excessively stale. Because the
timely claim and the recoupment claim must arise out of the same transaction or event,
recoupment does not significantly contravene these policies. See supra text accompanying
notes 126-28.
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claim "did not exist" until the Tax Court settlement determined
that the 1976 transfer was taxable as income, 250 and later asserting,
"[T]he deficiency assessment was sufficient to put in issue the right
to recoupment .... "2-1 More consistent with prior case law is the
view that the Commissioner's deficiency determination, rather than
the issue's ultimate disposition by a court, is the event giving rise
to the taxpayer's right to assert recoupment.5 2
More significant, many of the premises on which his argument
rests appear unsupported by, if not inconsistent with, principles
enunciated in other decisions. For example, Justice Stevens implies
that the government's conduct should be treated as having tolled
the statute of limitations.2 3 Yet prior case law generally had re-
jected the view that subsequent, inconsistent taxation of a trans-
action retroactively tolls the statute of limitations, thus expanding
the time in which to sue for the refund of an otherwise time-barred
tax. 254 He urged, "[I]f it was not too late for the government to
2" Dalm, - U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1372.
251 Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1373.
252 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 614-615 (noting that because the "Tax Court does
not currently have the power to consider a claim of equitable recoupment," and because
its jurisdiction is exclusive once properly invoked, "it is advisable to determine in advance
of commencing action in that court whether equitable recoupment is an important issue in
the controversy because the mere timely filing of a petition . . . in the Tax Court will
generally operate to bar a suit for refund"). This view reflects the general understanding
that the taxpayer must decide prior to filing a Tax Court petition whether a viable recoup-
ment claim exists; if so, the taxpayer should resort to a refund action in a federal district
court or the United States Claims Court. The clear implication is that the basis for the
claim exists when the taxpayer is faced with the choice of forum (i.e., when the Commis-
sioner has issued a notice of deficiency that seeks a tax that is inconsistent with an earlier
paid tax), rather than when a court ultimately sustains the deficiency. See also infra note
254 (discussing cases on the question of when the statute of limitations begins to run on a
refund claim, and generally rejecting in that context any concept of "tolling").
"I As noted earlier, Justice Stevens framed the issue as whether "a statute of limitations
otherwise barring a refund of federal income tax [was] tolled" by the government's conduct.
Dalm, __ U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1370.
21 A related argument, largely rejected by the courts, and by the majority in Dalm, is
that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the taxpayer's cause of action
accrues, that is, until some later, inconsistent event occurs. For example, Provident Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Pa. 1981), involved suits for refund of
overpaid income taxes premised upon the taxpayers' claimed right to increase the basis of
property acquired by gift but subsequently held includible in the transferor's estate pursuant
to an estate tax liability settlement in the Tax Court. The court held that the taxpayers'
actions were time-barred, implicitly rejecting their argument that the income tax limitations
period had not commenced until the Tax Court's decision in the estate tax case. See also
Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 330 F.2d 635 (Ct. Cl. 1964). There, a
decedent's estate filed an estate tax return and paid estate tax in April 1955. In June 1957,
the Commissioner determined deficiencies in the decedent's 1945-1953 income taxes, which
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litigate the tax consequences of the 1976 payment, it should not
the estate contested in the Tax Court, where a stipulated decision was entered in April,
1960, finding additional income taxes and penalties due of over $41,000. After payment,
the estate sought an estate tax refund, contending that it should have been entitled to deduct
these amounts for estate tax purposes. The Court of Claims held that this estate tax refund
action was barred by the statute of limitations, stating that ordinarily, a tax must be treated
as 'paid' or 'overpaid' when the actual payment was made, not at some later time, even
though events occasioning a decrease in liability for the tax may occur after the payment."
Id. at 639. The court was unwilling to imply any exception to this general rule, where the
estate had nearly ten months from the mailing of the income tax deficiency notice to file a
timely estate tax refund claim.
In Kellogg, the estate sought recovery of a time-barred estate tax after paying the
decedent's income tax deficiencies; thus, the facts fit the "Herring-Bowcut model" of
equitable recoupment except that, under that model, recoupment of a barred estate tax is
obtained by bringing a timely suit for recovery of income tax paid, instead of estate tax.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Perhaps realizing this, the same estate later
instituted a district court suit based on recoupment, seeking a refund of the income taxes
paid. See Holzer v. United States, 250 F.Supp. 875 (E.D. Wis. 1966), aff'd, 367 F.2d 822
(7th Cir. 1966) (per curiam). However, unlike the facts of the "Herring-Bowcut model,"
the estate had first contested these income tax deficiencies in the Tax Court, instead of
paying them first and suing for a refund. Thus, this subsequent suit for refund of income
taxes was barred by I.R.C. § 6512(a), which precludes suits for the refund of a tax that
has been the subject of a timely filed Tax Court petition. See id.
The Court of Claims, in Kellogg, applied the general rule that the statute of limitations
begins to run when a tax is paid, not when some later inconsistent event occurs. However,
it expressly left open the issue of whether this rule should apply even in a case where the
later, inconsistent event occurred after the close of the limitations period, such that the
taxpayer could not have protected herself even by taking prompt action. In Dalm, the
majority appears to have determined that it should apply even in such a case, since there,
even though a gift tax refund claim was time-barred when the Commissioner's income tax
deficiency determination was mailed, the Court rejected Dalm's argument that her gift tax-
related cause of action did not arise until it was determined that she owed income tax on
the 1976 transfer. The Court commented:
The most sensible interpretation of 6511(a) is that a tax is paid when the
taxpayer tenders payment of the tax to the IRS, not when the taxpayer
discovers that the payment was erroneous. The very purpose of statutes of
limitation in the tax context is to bar the assertion of a refund claim after a
certain period of time has passed, without regard to whether the claim would
otherwise be meritorious. That a taxpayer does not learn until after the
limitations period has run that a tax was paid in error, and that he or she has
a ground upon which to claim a refund, does not operate to lift the statutory
bar.
Dalm, - U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 1369 n.7. This view discredits the approach taken
in Reeves v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Pa. 1957), which allowed an action for
refund of estate tax that was otherwise time-barred on a theory that the cause of action
had not accrued until the grounds for the refund claim became apparent. In Reeves, an
estate tax return was filed in February, 1950, which included the value of anticipated refunds
of the decedent's 1943-1946 income taxes, indicated by the Internal Revenue Service to be
forthcoming. In April, 1952, the Service proposed a $3,000 estate tax deficiency, which the
estate paid in installments, the last consisting of $2,312.12, which was remitted in July,
1952. In November, 1952, contrary to its earlier indications, the Service assessed deficiencies
of over $16,000 in the decedent's 1943-1946 income taxes, which the estate paid between
1990-91] EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT REVISITED
be too late for the taxpayer to do so. ' ' 1 Desirable as this principle
may be from a prescriptive standpoint, it is not accurate as a
descriptive proposition concerning the state of the law, for if it
were, the remedies provided by the mitigation provisions, or eq-
uitable recoupment and similar equitable doctrines, would be un-
necessary. Moreover, Justice Stevens's suggested distinction in 2.8
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), between actions to recover "taxes alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected," and ac-
tions to recover "any sum ... wrongfully collected under the
internal-revenue laws," culminating in his view that recoupment
actions fall within the latter category and are thus not subject to
the limitations period of I.R.C. § 6511(a), appears not to have
been perceived in other cases involving recoupment. 216
October, 1952 and April, 1953. In July, 1955, the estate filed an estate tax refund claim
based upon claimed deductions for the income tax deficiencies. The Service acknowledged
that such deductions would result in an estate tax refund of approximately $6,300, but,
relying on the statute of limitations, refused to refund any more than that portion of estate
tax paid within the preceding three-year period (that is, the $2,313.12 installment paid in
July, 1952). The court, however, ordered a refund of the balance of the claim, holding that
a cause of action for refund of the estate tax did not accrue until November, 1952, when
the Service assessed the income tax deficiencies. It noted that because the Service had
changed its initial position concerning the decedent's income tax liabilities, and the estate
tax return reflected all known assets and liabilities, a contrary result would be inequitable
and unjust.
Although the view espoused in Reeves that the statute of limitations begins to run
when the grounds for the taxpayer's cause of action become apparent, rather than when
the tax itself is paid, was effectively rejected by the majority in Dalm, the result there could
have been reached properly by relying upon equitable recoupment. Specifically, the estate
in Reeves should have sought recoupment of the estate tax overpayment by styling its July,
1955 claim as one for refund of the income tax deficiencies paid between October, 1952
and April, 1953. Such an income tax refund claim apparently would have been timely under
the statute of limitations then in effect (section 910 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939),
which allowed three years after the payment of the tax in which to file refund claims.
Compare I.R.C. § 6501 (1988) (prescribing that claims be filed within three years of the
filing of a return, or within two years of payment of a tax, whichever period expires later).
"I Dalm, - U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1373.
256 In Flora, 362 U.S. 145, a case not involving recoupment, the Court observed that
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) uses the terms "any internal-revenue tax," "any penalty," and "any
sum," in the disjunctive. It therefore construed the term "any sum" to "refer to amounts
which are neither taxes nor penalties," indicating:
Under this interpretation, the function of the phrase is to permit suit for
recovery of items which might not be designated as either "taxes" or "pen-
alties" by Congress or the courts. One obvious example of such a "sum" is
interest. And it is significant that many old tax statutes described the amount
which was to be assessed under certain circumstances as a "sum" to be added
to the tax, simply as a "sum," as a "percentum," or as "costs."
Id. at 149. The foregoing language, which suggests that the phrase "any sum" refers only
to amounts that are not "taxes," seems at odds with Justice Stevens's contention that
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Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Justice Stevens's opin-
ion is that it would permit a taxpayer first to contest an asserted
deficiency in the Tax Court and then, if unsuccessful, pay the tax
and bring an independent refund suit in a forum in which recoup-
ment can be raised. Although permissible in the abstract, such an
approach requires approval of one of two alternatives, each of
which appears untenable given the current state of the law, as
illustrated by reference to the facts of Dalm.
Under the first alternative, Dalm could attempt to comply with
the historically justified "two wrongs make a right theory" of
recoupment, by denominating her subsequent refund suit as one
for recovery of the income tax paid pursuant to the Commissioner's
deficiency determination. In doing so, however, she would have
encountered a seemingly insurmountable statutory hurdle, I.R.C.
§ 6512(a), which generally precludes suits for the recovery of any
part of a tax that was the subject of a timely filed Tax Court
petition. Because no comparable provision applied, the executor in
Bull was allowed to maintain a subsequent suit for refund of
income tax after contesting the income tax deficiency before the
Board of Tax Appeals. The statute would now foreclose this pro-
cedural route.257
Under the second alternative, Dalm's subsequent refund suit
could be, as it was, denominated as one seeking recovery of the
Dalm's action was one to recover "any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner
collected under the internal-revenue laws," rather than one to recover "any internal-revenue
tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected" within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). Moreover, Justice Kennedy observed that "neither the I.R.C.
nor our authorities" supported the view that in bringing an action based on recoupment
the taxpayer is seeking the recovery not of an "internal revenue tax erroneously or illegally
collected", but rather a "sum wrongfully collected." He noted that I.R.C. § 6511(a)
prescribes the limitations period for refund claims of an "overpayment" of a tax, and
urged that for this purpose, an overpayment occurs when a taxpayer pays more than is
owed, for whatever reason or no reason at all. This position appears to have statutory
support in I.R.C. § 6401(c) (1988), which provides that an amount paid as tax shall not be
considered not to constitute an overpayment solely by reason of the fact that there was no
tax liability in respect of which such amount was paid. Justice Kennedy pointed out that in
Bull, the Court had characterized the inconsistent tax sought to be recovered as an "over-
payment" and that Dalm's action itself was clearly denominated as a suit for the recovery
of "overpaid" gift tax. See - U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 1368 n.6; supra note 138.
Given these considerations, it is difficult to sustain Justice Stevens's view that characterizing
DaIm's suit as one for the recovery of an overpaid gift tax is merely a "fiction," and his
resulting conclusion that it was not subject to the limitations period of I.R.C. § 6511(a).
257 See Elbert v. Johnson, 164 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1947), discussed supra note 111;
Holzer, 250 F. Supp. 875, discussed supra note 254 (holding that the mere filing of the Tax
Court petition is sufficient to invoke the application of I.R.C. § 6512(a)).
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gift tax itself. But this would place her in an equally perplexing
situation. Having litigated to its conclusion the issue of her income
tax liability before the Tax Court, she would no longer be using
recoupment in its traditional sense, as a defense to the govern-
ment's deficiency determination, but instead as a separate inde-
pendent ground for suit, a position generally discredited by prior
cases. 218 Equally problematic, the action would be explicitly seeking
the recovery of a tax that is, on its face, time-barred under I.R.C.
§ 6511 (a).
Thus, allowing either alternative requires the explicit disregard
of one of these statutes. Although the "two wrongs make a right"
theory can be labeled a "fiction," z 9 because it pretends that the
recoupment claim actually seeks recovery of the timely, rather than
time-barred tax, it is at least apparently consistent with the statu-
tory scheme outlined above. That is not the case under the scenario
suggested by Justice Stevens, since allowing a subsequent refund
suit after the taxpayer petitions the Tax Court would conflict with
either I.R.C. § 6512(a) or the statute of limitations itself.26
Thus, Justice Stevens's approach would expand recoupment
beyond its historically developed limits, by permitting a suit ex-
plicitly seeking recovery of a time-barred tax. His efforts in this
regard are understandable since, unlike the majority, he expressly
recognized the harshness of the Court's holding. Given the relevant
statutory provisions and prior case law, however, his position raises
substantial difficulties.2 61
21 See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
21 Holzer, 250 F.Supp. at 877.
- This latter criticism was made by Professor Andrews concerning the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Kolom. He noted that if recoupment is a permissible basis for a refund suit for
the barred year, rather than the open year, then it completely undercuts the statute of
limitations. In such a case, recoupment no longer operates merely to diminish the opposing
party's right to recover, but, instead, serves as an independent ground for obtaining a
refund that is directly barred by the statute of limitations. See Andrews, supra note 16, at
626 n.193.
2" Justice Stevens would allow a taxpayer to proceed, as Dalm had, by contesting the
Commissioner's determination in the Tax Court, and when unsuccessful there, to pay the
deficiency and file a refund suit in the district court or Claims Court based upon recoupment.
Although he suggested that this procedural route would not involve a problem of claim
preclusion, presumably because the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to hear an equitable
recoupment claim, the issue does not seem quite that clear. A claim may be precluded even
though a party first resorts to a tribunal that, because of its limited jurisdiction, could not
have granted the requested relief, so long as there was a court available within the same
system of courts that could have granted the relief. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 24, comment g (1980). The stated rationale is that the plaintiff, "having voluntarily
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CONCLUSION
United States v. Dalm262 represents the Supreme Court's first
revisitation of the doctrine of equitable recoupment in over forty
years. As when last considered, in Rothensies v. Electric Storage
Battery Co., the Court "decine[d] to 'expand the doctrine beyond
the facts of" Bull v. United States and Stone v. White. 263
For a taxpayer confronted with a deficiency determination,
against which she seeks to assert a claim of equitable recoupment
brought his action in a court which can grant him only limited relief, cannot insist upon
maintaining another action on the claim." Id. The Restatement gives the following as an
example of this principle:
A person suing upon certain claims against the United States has a choice of
courts: he may sue in a United States District Court, but in that event he may
not recover in excess of $10,000; alternatively he may sue in the United States
Court of Claims, and recovery is then unlimited. A sues the United states in
the District Court; his claim is assessed at $25,000; he recovers judgment for
$10,000. A cannot maintain an action in the Court of Claims to recover
further damages.
Id. at comment g, illustration 15.
An exception to this proposition is recognized where a plaintiff was unable to rely on
a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action
because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(c) (indicating that the general rule stated earlier assumed
that the jurisdiction in which the first judgment was rendered presented no formal barriers
to a litigant's presenting to a court in one action the entire claim, including any theories of
recovery or demands for relief that might have been available under applicable law). Where
such barriers in fact exist, it is considered unfair to preclude a second action in which to
present those phases of the claim that the party was disabled from presenting in the first
action. Id. comment c. The Restatement gives as an example of this situation a case in
which a given transaction results in liability under state law and under a federal statute
enforceable exclusively in a federal court, indicating that an adverse judgment in the state
court would not bar a subsequent federal court action on the federal claim. Although the
facts of Dalm might be viewed as within this exception, the approach of § 26(l)(c) has been
criticized on the ground that "there seems to be no reason for letting a plaintiff split the
cause of action in this way and he probably may not do so in the ordinary situation." F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CrvM PROCEDURE § 11.13, at 612 (3d ed. 1985) (citing Migra v.
Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), and RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 24, comment g; cf. 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4470, at 372 (1991 Supplement) (suggesting, in the context of claim preclusion in federal
court after a state court action:
The argument in favor of claim preclusion begins with the general res judicata
policy that it is better to require that all claims arising out of a single
transaction be brought in a single suit. If different courts present different
jurisdictional opportunities, the plaintiff should be required to go first to the
court that can command jurisdiction of the widest array of theories growing
out of the single transaction. Whatever court is chosen, any theory that could
have been advanced in the court of broadest jurisdiction is precluded in a
second action.).
"I -_ U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990).
10 See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946).
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for a previously paid, but time-barred tax imposed with respect to
the same transaction, Dalm marks the doctrine's limits. In such a
case, the taxpayer may not first contest the deficiency before the
Tax Court and thereafter use the recoupment claim as the sole
basis of jurisdiction in an independent refund suit in the district
court or Claims Court. Despite the denial of recoupment on the
facts presented, the Court did not purport to preclude the doc-
trine's application when the taxpayer does not first resort to the
Tax Court and when the doctrine is asserted in a timely refund
suit brought in response to the Commissioner's deficiency deter-
mination. It would be unfortunate and inappropriate for courts in
future cases to view Dalm as requiring an overly restrictive ap-
proach to recoupment, thus limiting its availability even in situa-
tions where it has traditionally been permitted.
264
2' In Fairley v. United States, 901 F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 1990), a case involving recoup-
ment on the "Herring-Bowcut model," the Eighth Circuit purported to follow, but appears
to have misinterpreted, the Supreme Court's decision in Dalm.
In Fairley, an executor filed an estate tax return and paid estate tax of approximately
$67,000 in February 1982. The Service thereafter determined deficiencies in the decedent's
1978, 1979, and 1980 income taxes. These were paid on January 31, 1984, but the 1978
deficiency payment was erroneously returned to the estate and ultimately repaid by it on
August 13, 1984. In August, 1985, the estate filed an estate tax refund claim, rejected by
the Service as untimely, deducting the deficiencies for estate tax purposes. On August 11,
1986, the estate filed a refund claim for the 1978 income tax, which the government denied,
and the taxpayer commenced a refund suit. The government apparently conceded that the
estate could recoup against the 1978 income tax payment the amount of estate tax overpaid
as a result of the failure to deduct that payment. However, the district court held that the
estate could also recoup against the 1978 payment the estate tax savings generated by
deducting 1979 and 1980 income tax deficiency payments. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It
believed the case analogous to Dalm, stating that the taxpayer "has invoked equitable
recoupment in a separate suit for refund of estate tax, rather than as a defense to the
government's assessment of an income tax deficiency." It found that here, the 'main
action' is the suit for equitable recoupment." Id. at 693 (emphasis in original).
However, unlike in Dalm, the taxpayer in Fairley was not bringing a refund suit for
a time-barred tax (here, estate tax) after contesting the income tax deficiency in the Tax
Court. Rather, he was bringing a timely suit for refund of 1978 income tax, which he had
not previously litigated in the Tax Court and which was timely because it was paid on
August 13, 1984, with claim therefor filed on August 11, 1986, within the two-year limita-
tions period of I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1988). Thus, the Eighth Circuit appears to have miscon-
strued both the nature of the taxpayer's suit and the scope and applicability of Dalm, which
does not preclude raising a claim for recoupment of a time-barred tax in the context of a
timely suit for refund of the tax alleged to be inconsistent with that tax. This should be
true even if, as may have occurred in Fairley, the taxpayer concedes the correctness of the
later paid tax and relies solely upon a recoupment theory, so long as the claim and suit for
such tax (the 1978 income tax in Fairley) are timely.
The result in Fairley was thus not compelled by Dalm, and must be justified, if at all,
on other grounds. The Eighth Circuit thought it unnecessary to decide whether the "single
transaction" requirement was satisfied. Yet, the Fairley result can be justified as a narrow
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Notwithstanding the concerns noted earlier, the majority's
holding in Dalm is consistent with applicable precedent and the
theory underlying recoupment. It reconciles the doctrine with the
relevant statutes prescribing time limitations for suits against the
government and providing for federal court jurisdiction, by re-
quiring that recoupment be raised in a timely suit over which a
court has jurisdiction. 265
Despite its technical correctness, the principal difficulty posed
by the majority's holding is, as decried by Justice Stevens, its harsh
effect on taxpayers that have a recoupment based claim, but wish
to contest a deficiency determination in the Tax Court. 26 Despite
the contrary implication of the majority's opinion, the Tax Court
would almost certainly refuse, on jurisdictional grounds, to hear
such a claim. Thus, the sole avenue for redress is to raise the claim
before a court having jurisdiction without first resorting to the Tax
Court.267 However, full payment of the deficiency is a prerequisite
construction of that requirement. As noted, the government conceded that the executor
could recoup against the 1978 income tax payment, but not 1979 and 1980, the amount by
which the estate tax liability would have been reduced by taking into account a deduction
for that payment, a result sustained by the Eighth Circuit. In essence, this represents a
narrow view of the single transaction requirement; it suggests that in the Herring-Bowcut
situation, where the Commissioner has determined income tax deficiencies for several taxable
years, recoupment against any given deficiency payment will be allowed only to the extent
estate tax would have been reduced had that particular payment, rather than all such
payments, been deducted for estate tax purposes. So viewed, the result in Fairley is justifiable
because only the refund claim for 1978, and not for 1979 and 1980, was timely. Thus,
taxpayers seeking to assert recoupment in this situation should ensure that they file timely
income tax refund claims for all taxable years for which income tax deficiencies were
determined and paid.
26 By requiring that the recoupment claim be raised in the very same proceeding in
which the taxpayer contests the propriety of the deficiency determination, rather than in a
later, separate action, the result in Dalm may be said to promote judicial economy.
Perhaps the most obvious reason for preferring to litigate the correctness of the
deficiency in the Tax Court is that access to that forum does not require payment of the
tax prior to litigation. See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1988). However, there may be additional
reasons for such a preference. Since the Tax Court deals exclusively with issues of federal
taxation, it may be perceived as able to deal more effectively with complex tax issues.
Moreover, it has been suggested that litigation costs in the Tax Court may be lower in light
of the court's emphasis on the stipulation process. See Rule 91, Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure (requiring stipulation of all facts, documents and evidence which fairly
should not be in dispute). Furthermore, depending upon the amount of the asserted
deficiency, a taxpayer may wish to take advantage of the Tax Court's less formal procedures.
See I.R.C. § 7463 (1988) Rule 177(b), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure (providing
that trials of small tax cases shall be conducted as informally as possible consistent with
orderly procedure).
- Although, as Justice Kennedy noted in his opinion, recoupment can be raised at
the administrative level, it is not clear whether the Service would require full payment of a
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to such a refund suit, and, therefore, to judicial determination of
the recoupment claim. Justice Stevens characterized this situation
as presenting a Hobson's choice among competing fora, and he
sought to avoid this harsh result by sanctioning the procedural
route taken by Dalm. As appealing as it may be from a fairness
standpoint, his position would require an expansion of equitable
recoupment beyond its previously defined limits.
This Article notes the substantial tension, in the area of federal
tax, between the goal of finality, served by statutes of limitations,
and the goal of correctness. The doctrine of equitable recoupment
has served to alleviate the otherwise harsh consequences resulting
from a strict application of statutes of limitations where the same
item, transaction or event is twice subjected to tax on inconsistent
theories. However, the Court applied a further limitation on the
doctrine by emphasizing that recoupment must be raised in a timely
proceeding over which a court otherwise has jurisdiction. Since the
Tax Court historically has been held to lack jurisdiction to apply
equitable recoupment, taxpayers seeking to employ the doctrine
first have to pay the entire amount of an asserted deficiency and
then raise the doctrine in a refund suit.
One potentially fruitful course would be for Congress to reex-
amine the reasons for the Tax Court's lack of jurisdiction to apply
equitable recoupment, and to consider vesting the Tax Court with
at least limited jurisdiction to hear these claims. In the meantime,
taxpayers must be more circumspect than ever about their choice
of forum, because if they contest a deficiency in the Tax Court,
the Court's decision in Dalm will foreclose a subsequent refund
suit that relies upon equitable recoupment as its sole basis for
jurisdiction.
deficiency in order to consider or allow a recoupment claim. See Andrews, supra note 16,
at 626 (suggesting that recoupment can be raised "during or following a Service-initiated
audit in order to reduce or eliminate any otherwise resulting deficiency"). It is clear that if
the taxpayer desires judicial review of a recoupment claim, it must resort to a refund forum,
which requires full payment of the asserted deficiency.
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